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In a decision that shocked many observers, the Court of Justice for the 
European Union (CJEU) rejected the EU’s draft agreement to accede to the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) on the basis that it 
threatened the autonomy of the EU legal order.1  The decision identified the 
legal order with its highest court and insisted on that court’s (its own) 
primacy as interpreter.2  This type of approach did not appear in Luxembourg 
out of the blue.  Rather it reflects thinking that has been prevalent in the law 
reform decisions of several EU member states that also saw their autonomy 
as under threat from the ECHR.  Parliaments, particularly in the old 
democratic systems that value parliamentary supremacy, have sought to 
empower their own national judges to counter the threat to sovereignty they 
see from the ECHR.  
In Western Europe, judicial review means review by international courts. 
Acceding to the ECHR and allowing individual petition to the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Strasbourg brought significant changes 
to both substantive rights and legal institutions throughout Europe.  One of 
the most fundamental is the adoption of ex post judicial review.3  While a 
number of countries adopted constitutional review in the wake of their 
experiences with authoritarian governments, the older parliamentary 
democracies saw no need to change their constitutional structures to include 
it.  That pattern has begun to change.  France and the United Kingdom have 
both had long internal debates with respect to whether judges should be 
permitted to engage in constitutional review of legislation; both now allow 
it.4  Likewise, Belgium adopted a scheme very similar to the French one5 and 
                                                                                                                   
 1 Opinion 2/13, Opinion pursuant to Article 218(11) TFEU – Accession of the European 
Union to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454, paras. 184–200 (Dec. 18, 2014), available at http://eur-lex. 
europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62013CV0002&from=EN. 
 2 Id. paras. 245–48. 
 3 “Ex post” judicial review means review of a law after it has been implemented.  In 
contrast, “a priori” judicial review refers to review of a law before it has been implemented. 
 4 Loi 2009-1523 du 10 décembre 2009, relative à l’application de l’article 61-1 de la 
constitution [Law 2009-1523 of December 10, 2009 relative to the Application of Article 61-1 
of the Constitution], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL 
GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Dec. 11, 2009, p. 21379; Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (Eng.); 
Constitutional Reform Act, 2005, c. 4 (Eng.). 
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the idea seems to be spreading northward; having been introduced in the 
Netherlands and several Scandinavian countries.6  These reforms are a 
measure of both the unease and the embeddedness of parliaments in a 
European rights system.  
With some exceptions,7 scholars have discussed these reforms as they 
have occurred in a specific national context.8  However, they ought to be 
seen together as part of a widely adopted strategy of managing Europe’s 
transnational counter-majoritarian difficulty.  Members of parliament in 
several jurisdictions predicted that more judicial review at home would mean 
less review abroad. The new judicial review will certainly not defend against 
the encroaching European judicial review, but it does create a space for 
national jurisdictions within the European order.  Thus, despite the strikingly 
nationalist rhetoric, the reforms represent a conciliatory stance towards 
integration.  They set, not boundary lines, but the terms of a dialogue.  And 
they only serve to reduce resort to Strasbourg if national courts decide the 
                                                                                                                   
 5 Loi spéciale modifiant l’article 26 de la loi spéciale du janvier 1989 sur la Cour 
d’arbitrage [Special Law Modifying Article 26 of the Special Law of January 1989] of July 
12, 2009, MONITEUR BELGE [M.B.] [Official Gazette of Belgium], July 31, 2009, 51617. 
 6 Ran Hirschl, The Nordic Counternarrative, Democracy, Human Rights, and Judicial 
Review, 9 INT’L J. CONST. L. 449, 450–52 (2011); Monica Claes & Gerhard van der Schyff, 
Towards Judicial Constitutional Review in the Netherlands?, in CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE 
NETHERLANDS AND SOUTH AFRICA: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 123, 132 (Gerhard van der Schyff 
ed., 2008); Torbjörn Bergman, Sweden: Democratic Reforms and Partisan Decline in an 
Emerging Separation-of-Powers System, 27 SCANDINAVIAN POL. STUD. 203, 218 (2004). 
 7 Marco Tabarelli, The Influence of the EU and the ECHR on ‘Parliamentary Sovereignty 
Regimes’: Assessing the Impact of European Integration on the British and Swedish 
Judiciaries, 19 EUR. L.J. 340 (2013) (comparing the influence of EU and European law on the 
British and Swedish judiciaries). 
 8 See Anthony La Sueur, The Conception of the UK’s New Supreme Court, in BUILDING 
THE UK’S NEW SUPREME COURT: NATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 3, 7–8 
(Anthony La Sueur ed., 2007).  In France, scholarly discussion has contrasted the country’s 
weak contrôle de constitutionnalité (constitutional review) with its robust contrôle de 
conventionnalité (convention review).  See, e.g., Gerald L. Neuman, Anti-Ashwander: 
Constitutional Litigation as First Resort in France, 43 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 15 (2010); 
Jean-François Flauss, L’influence du droit européen sur l’instauration d’un contrôle de 
constitutionnalité des lois par la voie préjudicielle, in GUILLAUME DRAGO, L’APPLICATION DE 
LA CONSTITUTION PAR LES COURS SUPREMES ; CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL, CONSEIL D’ETAT, 
COUR DE CASSATION 165 (2007); Olivier Dutheillet de Lamothe, Contrôle de constitutionnalité 
et contrôle de conventionnalité, in  MELANGES EN L’HONNEUR DE DANIEL LABETOULLE (2007); 
Denys de Béchillon & Nicholas Molfessis, Sur les rapports entre le Conseil constitutionnel et 
les diverses branches du droit: propos introductifs, 16 CAHIERS DU CONSEIL 
CONSTITUTIONNEL 160 (2004).  
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same way Strasbourg would, further integrating European Rights norms into 
national jurisprudence. 
Many have discussed why a liberal democracy might choose judicial 
review when a constitution is being drafted or why it might seek to empower 
courts at a later date.  Legislators might want to empower courts as 
insurance, taking constitutional issues out of normal politics.9  They might 
believe that courts will be more faithful rights protectors than legislatures.10  
A party might think itself capable of protecting rights but fear that it will lose 
the next election,11 or rights issues might be so controversial that legislators 
would rather have judges make the decisions.12  In countries such as 
Germany, Italy, and Spain, judicial review was a way to insure against the 
danger of future authoritarian regimes as well as a way to rid current law of 
anti-democratic vestiges.13  In France, the moderate Gaullists’ fear that they 
would lose control of Parliament played a significant role in the country’s 
previous reform of the Constitutional Council.14  
The recent rise of judicial review in Western Europe seems to be driven 
not by these internal factors, but by the need to respond to external 
developments.  Transnational review displaces the control that national 
parliaments once had over a core part of their constitutions: the relationship 
between the state and its citizens.  The values that some identify with a 
certain idea of Europe, others identify with their own specific national legal 
orders.  They fear that Europeanization, particularly through the powerful 
and unelected CJEU and the Council of Europe’s ECtHR, will erode their 
democracies.  This is not a universalist Europe in which national rights are 
increasingly superfluous compared to deepening Europe-wide 
                                                                                                                   
 9 See, e.g., TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL 
COURTS IN ASIAN CASES 22–26 (2003). 
 10 See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, Commentary, Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, 79 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1971, 1986 (2004). 
 11 See, e.g., ALEC STONE, THE BIRTH OF JUDICIAL POLITICS IN FRANCE 238 (1992) 
(describing the political use of abstract review in France and Germany). 
 12 See, e.g., Ran Hirschl, The Political Origins of the New Constitutionalism, 11 IND. J. 
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 71, 106–08 (2004) (describing judicial review on national and 
European levels as elite self-preservation against populist democracy). 
 13 John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, Constitutional Adjudication: Lessons from Europe, 
82 TEX. L. REV. 1671, 1674–75 (2004). 
 14 See STONE, supra note 11, at 70–71. 
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commitments,15 but a Europe in which tension between the two shapes 
institutions at both the national and transnational levels.  This is what Neil 
Walker has termed “endemic boundary clash,” in which multiple and 
potentially competing sovereignties exist within as well as outside the state.16 
The growing importance of the Strasbourg court and the use of the ECHR 
by national judges have been accompanied by renewed calls for national bills 
of rights and by expanded domestic rights protection mandates for national 
courts.  Reactions have been particularly vehement in countries with a strong 
tradition of parliamentary sovereignty.  The United Kingdom, Belgium, and 
France have all changed their laws to create new avenues of national-level 
rights review.  Although they offered various and conflicting rationales for 
the changes, many politicians relied on the argument that the national 
constitution should be the primary instrument for preserving citizens’ rights.  
After assessing their own institutional capacity and that of domestic and 
transnational courts, sovereign parliaments gave domestic judges new 
authority to interpret the constitution.  This choice has not returned them to a 
more closed legal order.  Rather, it sets up new opportunities for conflict as 
the relationship of the ECHR to constitutional law is still uncertain, and all 
states remain subject to ultimate ECtHR review.  
Part II of this Article gives a brief overview of the European legal context 
and the ECtHR as an institution.  Part III describes the choice for judicial 
review in the United Kingdom and France, where years of parliamentary 
debates show the evolution of the idea of national courts as a response to 
Europe as the parliaments in question became more alarmed about the 
ECtHR’s review powers.  Finally, Part IV discusses the results of reform, 
demonstrating its limited scope and its link to ongoing reform efforts at the 
transnational level.   
II.  THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT 
Unlike constitutional reforms in some democracies, the Western 
European reforms did not involve a choice for or against judicial review.  
They were already subject to review by transnational courts under two 
distinct bodies of region-wide laws: EU law, the law of the European Union; 
                                                                                                                   
 15 But see Rubenfeld, supra note 10, at 1993–94; Jochen A. Frowein, The Transformation 
of Constitutional Law Through the European Convention on Human Rights, 41 ISR. L. REV. 
489, 493 (2008). 
 16 Neil Walker, Late Sovereignty in the European Union, in SOVEREIGNTY IN TRANSITION 3, 
27 (Neil Walker ed., 2006). 
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and European law, the law of the Council of Europe.  In some instances, 
national courts could apply these laws as well. 
Although, my discussion will focus on European law and the European 
Court of Human Rights because that court and its jurisprudence were of 
particular concern in parliamentary debate, EU law has an increasingly 
significant role in rights review in Europe.  The CJEU has often approached 
issues through a rights-based framework,17 and the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights only increases its mandate to do so.18  Additionally, the EU’s Treaty 
of Lisbon requires ECHR accession and that ECHR rights be treated as 
general principles of EU law;19 although the process is stalled as the result of 
the CJEU’s decision.20 
A.  Subsidiarity and Margin of Appreciation 
Two concepts are essential to discussion of both European and EU law.  
The first is subsidiarity, the principle that matters should be decided by the 
member states or their local authorities whenever possible with transnational 
authority acting as a subsidiary to that of the states.21  A transnational court 
acting according to this principle will not overturn a decision in a matter that 
national courts have handled adequately.22  The second concept, the margin 
of appreciation, defines how subsidiarity is to be applied.23  According to this 
principle, a national government should be afforded a margin of appreciation 
in how it interprets and applies ECHR rights.24  This may occur in a number 
of acceptable ways.25  Within the margin of appreciation, the judgment of 
                                                                                                                   
 17 ALEC STONE SWEET, THE JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE 89–91 (2004). 
 18 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Dec. 7, 2000, 2000 O.J. (C 
364/1), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text_en.pdf. 
 19 Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing 
the European Community, art. 6(2)–(3), Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1, available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12007L/TXT. 
 20 Opinion 2/13, supra note 1, para. 179. 
 21 See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 5(3), Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 
O.J. (C 326) 13, 18. 
 22 Id.  
 23 See VICKI C. JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN A TRANSNATIONAL ERA 57–58 
(2010) (offering a selection of descriptions of the margin of appreciation).  
 24 Id.  
 25 See generally AIDEN O’NEILL, EC LAW FOR UK LAWYERS 20–21 (2011) (explaining that 
courts can consider Community recommendations or take national measures when 
implementing Community law).  
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how to balance the individual right and the public interest belongs to national 
authorities.26  The principles suggest two rationales for avoiding ECtHR 
jurisdiction: domestic courts may have given the same answer as the ECtHR 
would, or they may have given a different answer that is nonetheless 
permissible under the ECHR. 
B.  The European Court of Human Rights 
First created by the ECHR in 1953, the ECtHR has been reorganized 
several times as its mandate has grown.  Currently, judges are appointed by 
states parties to the ECHR and assigned on a rotating basis to five sections, 
which are balanced for gender and geography.27  The court hears two types 
of applications related to ECHR violations: inter-state and individual.  The 
first are exceedingly rare; the second, exceedingly common.28  By 1990, all 
states parties allowed individual petition.29  Since the Convention requires 
state action, the state is the defendant in every ECHR claim.  If it finds a 
violation, the court may award monetary compensation under Article 41 and 
propose reforms to the government under Article 46.30  The Committee of 
Ministers supervises enforcement,31 but shows little alacrity in doing so.32  
The court’s original process was bureaucratic and less adversarial, 
limiting litigation by creating alternatives to it.  Under the original procedure, 
the Council of Europe’s Commission reviewed all individual petitions.33  If 
the petition was admissible, the Commission endeavored to bring about a 
friendly settlement between state and petitioner.34  If no settlement could be 
met, it transmitted a report regarding the facts and merits of the case to a 
political body, the Committee of Ministers.35  This transmittal started a three-
                                                                                                                   
 26 ROGER MASTERMAN, THE SEPARATION OF POWERS IN THE CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTION: 
JUDICIAL COMPETENCE AND INDEPENDENCE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 70 (2011). 
 27 REGISTRY OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, ANNUAL REPORT 2011, at 15–16, 
21 (2012), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Annual_report_2011_ENG.pdf. 
 28 Id. at 11. 
 29 Id.  
 30 Id. at 18. 
 31 Id. at 19. 
 32 Cf. Luzius Wildhaber, A Constitutional Future for the European Court of Human Rights, 
in THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1998–2006: HISTORY, ACHIEVEMENTS, REFORM 
113, 120–22 (2006) (noting problems in enforcement). 
 33 ANNUAL REPORT 2011, supra note 27, at 12. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id.  
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month clock for the court to hear the case.36  This procedure changed in 
1994, allowing an applicant to submit his case directly to a three-judge 
screening panel.37  
With individual petitions, the court’s caseload swelled to a point that it 
threatened the ECtHR’s effectiveness.38  The Council of Europe responded 
by allowing single judges to make decisions on applications and by 
consolidating thousands of cases.39  The court has finally begun to reduce the 
backlog.40  In 2012, its number of pending cases fell for the first time since 
1998.41  As of January 2015, 69,900 applications were pending before the 
court, down from 99,900 the year before.42 This downward trend continued 
in 2015, with 64,850 pending allocated applications in January 2016.43 
The court’s caseload suggests a number of possible problems, among 
them, a lack of understanding of the court’s role and a lack of national 
judicial capacity.  The number of inadmissible petitions suggests that 
Europeans know that they have rights, but do not necessarily know what 
these rights are or how to secure them.  The second issue, lack of national 
judicial capacity, is tangential to the ones explored in this Article.  The 
countries of the East that regularly top the court’s list of most rights 
violations, such as Ukraine and Russia, face struggles over resources, 
democratization, and rule of law different in character and magnitude from 
those animating legal debate in countries such as Germany or the United 
Kingdom.44  
                                                                                                                   
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Helen Keller, Andreas Fischer & Daniela Kühne, Debating the Future of the European 
Court of Human Rights After the Interlaken Conference: Two Innovative Proposals, 21 EUR. J. 
INT’L L. 1025, 1025–26 (2010). 
 39 This system started in 2010.  Id. at 1030–31.  In 2011, 46,930 cases were disposed of by 
a single judge.  In 2012, the number jumped to 81,764.  See EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS, ANALYSIS OF STATISTICS 2012, at 4 (2013), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Doc 
uments/Stats_analysis_2012_ENG.pdf; ANNUAL REPORT 2011, supra note 27, at 14–15. 
 40 Owen Bowcott, Backlog at European Court of Human Rights Falls Below 100,000 
Cases, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 30, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/law/2014/jan/30/Europe 
an-court-human-rights-case-backlog-falls. 
 41 ANALYSIS OF STATISTICS 2012, supra note 39, at 4. 
 42 EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, ANALYSIS OF STATISTICS 2014, at 4 (2015), http:// 
www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Stats_analysis_2014_ENG.pdf. 
 43 EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, ANALYSIS OF STATISTICS 2015, at 4 92016), http:// 
www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Stats_analysis_2015_ENG.pdf. 
 44 Robert Harmsen, The Transformation of the ECHR Legal Order and the Post-
Enlargement Challenges facing the European Court of Human Rights, in THE NATIONAL 
 
10 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.  [Vol. 44:1 
 
The ECtHR backlog affects my argument in several ways.  First and most 
pragmatically, the reforms that I discuss are so recent that their effects may 
only now be becoming visible in ECtHR case law.  The court’s high caseload 
also suggests that complaints that it has taken control of national rights 
debates identify the wrong villain.  By the time a case is heard in Strasbourg, 
national communities have had time to debate its merits.  The more likely 
culprit, if one exists, is a national judge wielding the ECHR.  That judge can 
introduce Strasbourg jurisprudence to reshape rights at a much earlier stage.  
Finally, attempts to respond to the high caseload offer a pro-Strasbourg 
rationale for reform that potentially reduces access to Strasbourg or seeks to 
offer a substitute.  A litigant investing more time and resources in pursuing 
her case under the national constitution will take longer to get to Strasbourg, 
and will more likely win or abandon her case along the way.  To the extent 
that Strasbourg judges feel that their interests will be advanced by issuing 
fewer, more considered rulings, they may welcome the growth of national, 
constitutional review. 
III.  NEW JUDICIAL REVIEW IN OLD DEMOCRACIES 
Shortly after he was elected President of France, Nicolas Sarkozy gave a 
speech at Épinal, where Charles de Gaulle had denounced the ill-fated, 
Fourth Republic Constitution and proposed a Fifth Republic.  President 
Sarkozy called for significant reforms to the current, Fifth Republic 
Constitution, including to the Constitutional Council: “There is a paradox in 
the fact that French citizens can contest French laws in front of European 
courts but cannot contest French laws in front of French tribunals.”  Yet he 
did not include constitutional review in his reform agenda, considering it too 
“profound” a change.45 
Despite the President’s misgivings, his government later put forward a 
constitutional amendment giving the Constitutional Council the power to 
overrule the legislature by reviewing existing laws in response to 
“constitutional questions” raised by litigants.46  When the Amendment went 
                                                                                                                   
JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF THE ECHR AND EU LAWS: A COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE 27, 29–31 (Giuseppe Martinico & Oreste Pollicino eds., 2010). 
 45 Nicolas Sarkozy, President of Fr., Address at Épinal (July 12, 2007), http://discours.vie-
publique.fr/notices/077002273.html.  Unless otherwise noted, all translations from French are 
the author’s. 
 46 Loi 2009-1523 du 10 décembre 2009 relative à l’application de l’article 61-1 de la 
Constitution [Law 2009-1523 of December 10, 2009 relative to the application of article 61-1 
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into effect in 2010, it marked the first time in history that France had allowed 
concrete judicial review of constitutional claims.  
France was following the lead of its neighbors.  Among the experts called 
to discuss the reform in Parliament was Belgian Senator Francis Delpérée, 
who told the French deputies in the National Assembly that his own 
country’s concerns “are not very far from the preoccupations expressed in 
[their] bill.”47  Belgium, once similarly hostile to constitutional review, has 
changed the name of its Cour d’Arbitrage to Constitutional Court and has 
given it constitutional review powers with priority over transnational law.48 
A less obvious comparison surfaced during the Senate floor debates—the 
United Kingdom, too, has a strong tradition of parliamentary supremacy.49  
Nevertheless, the United Kingdom had introduced constitutional review in 
two stages: the Human Rights Act (HRA), which allowed courts to declare 
incompatibility between the Act and other laws;50 and the creation of a 
Supreme Court, which consolidated most final HRA review into one body.51  
Recently, Norway engaged in a similar reform.  Although Norwegian courts 
have long engaged in cautious constitutional review of legislation, the 
constitution contained a very limited menu of rights protections.52  The 
Norwegian parliament significantly expanded this list in an effort to “bring 
                                                                                                                   
of the Constitution] JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL 
GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Dec. 11, 2009, 21379. 
 47 Hearing on A.N. no. 1599 Before the Commission des lois constitutionnelles, de la 
législation et de l’administration générale de la République [Commission on constitutional 
law, legislation, and general administration  of the Republic] (CR 58), 2008–2009 Leg., 13th 
Sess. Ordinaire 10 (23 June 2009), available at http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/cr-cloi/ 
08-09/c0809058.asp#P12_1410. 
 48 Loi spéciale modifiant l’article 26 de la loi spéciale 6 du janvier 1989 sur la Cour 
d’arbitrage [Special Law Modifying Article 26 of the Special Law of January 1989] of July 
12, 2009, MONITEUR BELGE [MB] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF BELGIUM] July 31, 2009, 51617. 
 49 Sénat, Session Ordinaire de 2009–2010, Séance du mardi 13 octobre 2009, Débats 
Parlementaires, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE 
OF FRANCE], Oct. 13, 2009, p. 8572 (statement of Sen. Patrice Gélard).  
 50 Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (Eng.); Constitutional Reform Act, 2005, c. 4 (Eng.).   
 51 Not all Scots cases are subject to final review by the Supreme Court.  See Courts Reform 
(Scotland) Act, 2014, (A.S.P. 18), § 117 (introducing the requirement that permission be 
obtained to appeal civil cases); Scotland Act, 2012, c. 11 (U.K.) (providing that the High 
Court of Justiciary, Scotland’s supreme criminal court, retains power to ultimately resolve 
cases once the U.K. Supreme Court has determined the legal question at issue). 
 52 Anine Kierulf, Norway: Human Rights and Judicial Review Constitutionalized, INT’L J. 
CONST. L. BLOG (June 5, 2015), http://www.iconnectblog.com/2015/06/norway-human-rights-
and-judicial-review-constitutionalized. 
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rights home,” constitutionalizing rights already protected by the ECHR and 
domestic statutes as well as amending the constitution to explicitly authorize 
judicial review.53  Like the French and Belgian parliaments, the Norwegian 
parliament was concerned that Norwegians were relying too heavily on the 
Convention in Norwegian courts and sought to make rights adjudication a 
domestic matter.54  
Other Nordic countries and the Netherlands have traditionally given little 
space to constitutional review,55 however, parliaments are rethinking their 
traditional stance under pressure from Europe.56  In 1992, the Danish 
parliament voted to incorporate the ECHR into national law.57  The change 
was accompanied by arguments that incorporation was necessary to avoid 
censure at Strasbourg58—the type of defensive incorporation argument made 
a few years later in the United Kingdom.  In 2000, Finland overturned its 
long-standing rule forbidding judicial review of legislation, allowing courts 
to refuse to apply a law in cases in which doing so would be contrary to the 
Basic Law or the Constitution.59  This reform followed the 1995 introduction 
of new fundamental rights based on the ECHR and other treaties.60  
This section will focus on the examples of the United Kingdom and 
France. Both share a concern with parliamentary sovereignty and a 
                                                                                                                   
 53 Id.  This gesture suggests that Norwegian judges are seen as allies in the nationalization 
of rights.  This view may have merit; the Norwegian Supreme Court has sought to read the 
Convention in light of “traditional Norwegian value priorities.”  Geir Ulfstein & Andreas 
Føllesdal, The European Court of Human Rights and the Norwegian Supreme Court: 
Independence and Democratic Control, in THE INDEPENDENCE OF JUDGES 247, 253 (N.A. 
Engstad, A.L. Frøseth & B. Tønder eds., 2014). 
 54 Ulfstein & Føllesdal, supra note 52, at 253. 
 55 Article 120 of the Dutch Constitution, adopted in 1984, bans judicial review of 
legislation. Jerfi Uzman, Tom Barkhuysen & Michiel L. van Emmerik, The Dutch Supreme 
Court: A Reluctant Positive Legislator?, in NETHERLANDS REPORTS TO THE EIGHTEENTH 
INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 423, 426 (J.H.M. van Erp & L.P.W. van 
Vliet eds., 2010). 
 56 See Claes & van der Schoff, supra note 6, at 127–32 (describing a reform proposal in the 
Netherlands).  Some Dutch legislators have called for judicial review in cases affecting 
“fundamental rights.”  Gerhard van der Schoff, Constitutional Review by the Judiciary in the 
Netherlands: A Bridge too Far?, 11 GERMAN L.J. 275, 282 (2010). 
 57 Jens Elo Rytter & Marlene Wind, In Need of Juristocracy? The Silence of Denmark in 
the Development of European Legal Norms, 9 INT’L J. CONST. L. 470, 479 (2011). 
 58 Id.  
 59 Juha Lavapuro, Tuomas Ojanen & Martin Scheinin, Rights-Based Constitutionalism in 
Finland and the Development of Pluralist Constitutional Review, 9 INT’L J. CONST. L. 505, 
517–18 (2011). 
 60 Jaako Husa, Guarding the Constitutionality of Laws in the Nordic Countries: A 
Comparative Perspective, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 345, 366 (2000). 
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democratic deficit at the European level.  The significant differences between 
the common law and the French civil law tradition, as well as the political 
differences between the two countries, make their choice of a similar 
solution particularly striking.61  Because of a web of European treaties and 
popular expectations, neither country can avoid subjecting legislation to 
judicial review short of exiting the system.  The only choice that is open to 
them is whether and how to engage in rights review domestically.  This 
situation sets up the paradox whereby the reforms could be presented as 
appealing to both pro- and anti-European sentiments.  Pro-Europeans saw a 
chance for further integration of values.  In contrast, Euro-skeptics saw a 
chance for reduced oversight by the ECtHR and CJEU; that is, more 
attention to rights at the national level should prompt the transnational courts 
to avoid intervening.  
A.  Why Would a Court Protect a Parliament: The Administrative Rights 
Tradition 
In the United Kingdom in particular, reform proponents tended to hail 
from the more pro-Europe Labour Party.  In France, reform efforts began 
with the Socialists who might be less troubled by Strasbourg.  However, the 
Gaullists, who quite clearly viewed Europe as a threat, later took up the 
banner of reform as well.  New proposals from the British Conservative 
Party show that it has largely adopted Labour’s strategy, perhaps to avoid 
making significant changes to the law to appease a conservative base.62  Still, 
the argument for empowering national courts was more than an argument 
                                                                                                                   
 61 Unlike the French, the UK Constitution is based on a set of context-specific historical 
conventions without a single anchoring text.  But this difference is not as salient in the case of 
rights law.  The French Constitution includes no bill of rights, and constitutional rights today 
flow from judicial elaboration of the Preamble as well as “fundamental principles of the laws 
of the Republic,” which is as close to “the principles of the British Constitution” as it sounds.  
Compare Richard J. Cummins, The General Principles of Law, Separation of Powers and 
Theories of Judicial Decision in France, 35 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 594, 609 (1986) (describing 
the sources and scope of French constitutional law), with Thomas C. Grey, Origins of the 
Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary Though, 30 STAN. L. 
REV. 843, 850–65 (1978) (discussing the evolution of seventeenth and eighteenth century 
British “fundamental law”); R.C. Van Caenegen, Constitutional History: Chance or Grand 
Design?, 5 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 447, 543–54 (2009) (describing the basic principles of the 
British Constitution).  Judges in the two countries have different careers, training, and role 
expectations. 
 62 See infra Part III.B.2. 
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offered in bad faith by pro-European members seeking to win over 
conservatives skeptical of rights review.  Parliament’s sovereignty remains 
abridged whether it approves reform or not.  The only difference is whether 
domestic or foreign judges do the abridging. 
This difference is potentially significant to both countries because of the 
historical relationship between domestic courts and the parliaments in both 
Westminster and French-derived systems.63  These pure parliamentary 
systems rejected the American-style tripartite separation of powers.  
Parliament combined all three.  Independent judges were to help the British 
and French Parliaments effectively impose their will, and they did so in part 
by scrutinizing the administration of the law by the bureaucracy.  
Although France and Britain did not protect constitutional rights as such, 
courts in the twentieth century protected human rights through administrative 
law.  British judges developed the ultra vires and “Wednesbury 
unreasonableness” doctrines, which limited bureaucratic power to that 
clearly delegated by statute and not exercised in an “outrageous” manner.64  
Similarly, the French Council of State developed the doctrine of service 
public, which limits ways in which regulations can be imposed, balancing 
individual and general interests in a manner quite similar to constitutional 
proportionality doctrines.65  Courts striking down regulations did so in 
Parliament’s name—Parliament, it was said, could never have intended its 
laws to allow the agency in question to infringe on individual rights.66  This 
history helps to explain why national courts might be expected to speak for 
their parliaments when confronted with European law.  
                                                                                                                   
 63 See VERNON BOGDANOR, THE NEW BRITISH CONSTITUTION 13 (2009). 
 64 See Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corp. 1948 (K.B.) 223 (a 
regulation will not survive scrutiny if it is “[s]o outrageous in its defiance of logic or accepted 
moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be 
decided could have arrived at it”); Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil 
Service, [1985] I.C.R. 14. 
 65 See generally JACQUES CHEVALLIER, LE SERVICE PUBLIC (7th ed. 2008) (describing the 
elaboration of this doctrine). 
 66 See, e.g., Nicholas Bamforth, Ultra Vires and Institutional Independence, in JUDICIAL 
REVIEW AND THE CONSTITUTION 111, 116–19 (Christopher Forsyth ed., 2000) (describing how 
theorists have grounded judicial review of administrative law in parliamentary sovereignty).  
The French Council of State grew in importance and independence in concert with the 
flourishing of parliamentary democracy in the Third Republic.  STONE, supra note 11, at 32.  
It was in this period that the Council laid claim to key administrative law concepts such as 
misuse of power.  See, e.g., Pariset, CE, Nov. 28, 1875, Rec. Lebon 47544. 
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B.  Rights Brought Home to London 
The United Kingdom has responded to the growth of European rights law 
in two steps: first, “bringing rights home,” and second, consolidating national 
rights jurisprudence by creating a Supreme Court.  Historically, the British 
Constitution “could be summed up in just eight words ‘What the Queen in 
Parliament enacts is law.’ ”67  But in 1966, the United Kingdom began 
allowing citizens to appeal to the European Court of Human Rights.68  
Although they could not use the Convention directly as a source of law prior 
to the HRA, lawyers cited the ECHR and relevant case law to UK courts.69  
In 1972, the House of Lords held that the European Communities Act made 
Community law directly applicable as part of national law, allowing it to 
override acts of Parliament.70  The House of Lords put that law into effect 
when it relied on EU law to “disapply” domestic law in the 1991 Factortame 
case.71  That de facto loss of parliamentary sovereignty helped spur action on 
the long-discussed bill of rights.72  In turn, the development of rights review 
furthered the creation of a Supreme Court of the United Kingdom.73 
The 1998 Human Rights Act incorporates the ECHR into national law 
and allows UK judges to review the legality of other laws through reference 
to these rights.74  Judges cannot strike down legislation.  If a law conflicts 
with the HRA, a court may issue a “declaration of incompatibility,” which 
then starts a process to change the law in Parliament.75  The Act was the 
product of a long struggle to create some sort of written constitution, or at 
least a bill of rights, for the United Kingdom.76  Before the HRA, the United 
Kingdom had one of the highest rates of review by, and of losses in front of, 
                                                                                                                   
 67 BOGDANOR, supra note 63, at 13. 
 68 Id. at 58. 
 69 Id. at 10. 
 70 Id. 
 71 See id. at 57. 
 72 See ROBERT BLACKBURN, TOWARDS A CONSTITUTIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS FOR THE UNITED 
KINGDOM 5–10 (1999) (describing early debates over the issue). 
 73 Alyssa S. King, Recent Development, A Supreme Court, Supreme Parliament, and 
Transnational National Rights, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 245, 246–48 (2010). 
 74 Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (Eng.). 
 75 MARK TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS 28 (2008). 
 76 BLACKBURN, supra note 72, at 5. 
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the ECtHR.  Politicians often attributed those rates to the country’s lack of a 
domestic mechanism for handling rights questions.77  
Prior to the Constitutional Reform Act of 2005 (CRA),78 legislative, 
executive, and judicial power was consolidated in Parliament.  The judicial 
branch was represented by the Law Lords who sat in the House of Lords as 
legislators, and sat in the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords and on 
the Privy Council as judges.79  The CRA ultimately removed them from the 
legislature, giving them the title of “Justice.”80  The Government also sought 
a separate building for the Court.81  That physical, as well as legal, separation 
signals the importance of the courts and the Supreme Court’s status as a 
separate branch of government. 
The Supreme Court both promotes a new view of separation of powers 
and unifies jurisdiction of almost all of the United Kingdom’s top courts, as 
well as increases their visibility, continuing a theme from the HRA.82  Even 
though the United Kingdom has kept its weak courts, which do not have the 
power to definitively stop an Act of Parliament, their combination of the 
HRA and the Supreme Court has raised the profile of constitutional review 
and thus considerably raised the stakes of parliamentary non-compliance 
with the ECHR.  
1.  Bringing Rights Home 
Policy-makers began to seriously discuss a written bill of rights in the 
post-war period.83  The issue first went to general debate in Parliament in 
1975.84  The rise of rights jurisprudence at the European level, including the 
                                                                                                                   
 77 See, e.g., Mary Baber, HOME AFFAIRS SECTION, THE HUMAN RIGHTS BILL, 1997-8, H.C. 
98/24, at 14; Samantha Besson, The Reception Process in Ireland and the United Kingdom, in 
A EUROPE OF RIGHTS 31, 41 (Helen Keller & Alec Stone Sweet eds., 2008). 
 78 Constitutional Reform Act, 2005, c. 4 (Eng.). 
 79 Id. § 24.  By custom, Law Lords did not participate in legislative debate. 
 80 Id.  
 81 DEP’T FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM: A SUPREME COURT FOR 
THE UNITED KINGDOM 12 (2003), http://www.dca.gov.uk/consult/supremecourt/supreme.pdf. 
 82 See id. at 19–22. 
 83 See Peter Lanston Fitzgerald, An English Bill of Rights? Some Observations From Her 
Majesty’s Former Colonies in America, 70 GEO. L.J. 1229, 1239–46 (1982), for a discussion 
of the pressure the international human rights movement—particularly as manifested in the 
European Convention on Human Rights—exerted on the United Kingdom. 
 84 Id. at 1249.  So began a long line of doomed legislation aimed at incorporating the ECHR 
into national law.  See Bill of Rights, 1974-5, H.C. Bill [59]; Bill of Rights Bill, 1980-1, H.C. 
Bill [60]; Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Bill, 1985, 1985-6, H.L. Bill [21], 
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United Kingdom’s losses in front of the European Court of Human Rights, 
was instrumental in securing the HRA’s passage.85 
It is plausible to tell a straightforward story in which change in the United 
Kingdom came from a desire for institutional modernization and alignment 
with Europe.  Early supporters of Labour’s proposal also pointed out the gap 
between the United Kingdom and the continent and even its former colonies, 
suggesting that the country was behind the times.86  
Supporters of the HRA presented the change in more nationalistic terms.  
The Government showed great awareness that the choice presented to 
legislators in the late 1990s was not between more judicial review or less 
judicial review, but between review “at home” by UK judges or continued 
embarrassment abroad.  Even the name of the Government’s white paper on 
the HRA, Rights Brought Home, demonstrates the importance given to the 
localizing, rather than the harmonizing, aspect of the reform.87 
Moreover, the HRA’s supporters argued that the European rights they 
sought to incorporate into national law had a British origin, emphasizing 
their country’s role in the ECHR drafting process.88  With the HRA, they 
promised: “British judges will be enabled to make a distinctively British 
contribution to the development of the jurisprudence of human rights in 
Europe.”89  Issues that might have reached the European courts for want of 
local jurisdiction might be resolved at home; whereas those that did reach the 
supranational level might have a different quality.90  In this telling, British 
judges are set against “European” judges, who are identified with European 
                                                                                                                   
Human Rights Bill, 1993-4, H.C. Bill [38] (requires that laws be interpreted so that they are 
compatible with it); Human Rights Bill, 1994-5, H.L. Bill [5]; Human Rights Bill, 1996-7 
[11]. 
 85 Compare Labour Party, A Discussion Document on a Statutory Charter of Human Rights 
(1976), reprinted in BLACKBURN, supra note 72, at 917, 921, with HOME DEP’T, RIGHTS 
BROUGHT HOME: THE HUMAN RIGHTS BILL, 1997, Cm. 3782, ¶ 1.16, available at http://www. 
archive.official-documents.co.uk/document/hoffice/rights/contents.htm. 
 86 Jean-François Flauss, Human Rights Act 1998: Kaleidoscope, 48 REVUE FRANÇAISE DE 
DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL [FRENCH REVIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW] 695, 696 (2001). 
 87 HOME DEP’T, supra note 85, ¶ 1.14. 
 88 See 582 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (1997) 1227f, reprinted in BLACKBURN, supra note 
72, at 377. 
 89 HOME DEP’T, supra note 85, ¶ 1.14. 
 90 See Erin Delaney, Judiciary Rising: Constitutional Change in the United Kingdom, 108 
NW. U. L. REV. 543, 584–85 (2014) (noting that the HRA provided British courts with the 
ability to opine on Convention-based claims ex ante, giving them the opportunity to explain 
and distinguish the nature of the British practice at issue). 
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law.91  Lord Kingsland argued that European judges did not understand 
British practices, “which are, after all, unique.”92  Mike O’Brien, 
Undersecretary for the Home Department, echoed these views, arguing that 
UK courts interpreting the HRA “can assist in shaping those rights in a 
manner sensitive to our country’s ways.”93  Lord Woolf, then Master of the 
Rolls, took a similar view on an earlier, 1996, Human Rights Bill, noting that 
the United Kingdom was “losing a real opportunity to influence the 
European human rights jurisprudence.”94 
Here the judge is linked tightly with local law as its representative and 
promoter.  The primary value of the HRA was not in creating rights—these 
were already guaranteed at least in theory by the ECHR—but in allowing 
local courts to intervene in how rights are protected in practice.  This 
emphasis on the influence of British judges helps explain why the creation of 
a Supreme Court follows from rights legislation. 
2.  British Judges 
“Modernization” was also a theme of arguments in favor of a supreme 
court.95  The late Lord Bingham, one of the new court’s principle supporters 
and himself, an influential judge, described the separation of powers as “a 
cardinal aspect of a modern liberal democratic state governed by the rule of 
law.”96  Meanwhile, the opposition relied on British exceptionalism to 
explain why the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords should stay in 
Parliament.97  The Supreme Court promotes a vision of the separation of 
powers different from the one given by parliamentary sovereignty, which 
emphasizes unified, rather than separated, power.98  
                                                                                                                   
 91 King, supra note 73, at 246. 
 92 Quoted in BABER, supra note 77, at 26. 
 93 BLACKBURN, supra note 72, at 412. 
 94 Id. at 813.  Lord Woolf’s various responsibilities have included reforming the civil 
procedure system of England and Wales.  His voice, like those of Lords Lester and Bingham, 
serves to underscore just how significant these arguments are in the British legal 
establishment.  
 95 671 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (2005) 13 (U.K.). 
 96 Anthony Lester, The Human Rights Act 1998 – Five Years On, 3 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 
258, 271 (2004) (quoting Lord Bingham of Cornhill). 
 97 657 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (2004) 1221 (U.K.). 
 98 One example of this attitude is Lord Craig’s argument that removing the Law Lords from 
Parliament weakens them because as long as they remain in the House of Lords, an “attack on 
them individually or as a group would be an attack on Members of your Lordships’ House and 
an affront to the primacy of Parliament.”  657 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (2004) 1254 (U.K.). 
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European jurisprudence pushed the United Kingdom towards a more 
visible separation of powers. In McGonnell v. U.K., the ECtHR questioned 
the unity of the judiciary and legislature, holding that the combination of 
legislative and judicial roles was improper in a magistrate who served on a 
planning commission whose actions he was later to judge.99  The House of 
Lords can delay, but neither create nor veto legislation;100 and there was a 
convention against Law Lords taking part in legislative deliberations.101  
Still, several speakers worried that the ECtHR would eventually demand 
reforms.102  Having a supreme court was a question of being understood by 
the rest of Europe.103  A separate supreme court served to underscore the 
independence of British judges to domestic and international observers alike 
by making the highest court more visible.104 
The Government also called for the creation of a “single apex” for the 
national system.105 The HRA brought increased attention to UK 
constitutional law.106  Creating the Supreme Court unified rights jurisdiction, 
which until that point had been spread between the Lords and the Privy 
Council.107  Under devolution, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland were 
subject to Privy Council review for violations of the HRA.108  While the Law 
Lords sat on both courts, they had separate jurisdiction, raising the possibility 
                                                                                                                   
 99 McGonnell v. United Kingdom, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep. 289, 291 (2000).  But see 
MASTERMAN, supra note 26, at 80–84 (noting subsequent decisions have taken a more pragmatic 
approach). 
 100 The Parliament Act, 1949, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 13; see also The Parliament Acts, http:// 
www.parliament.uk/about/how/laws/parliamentacts (discussing the removal of the House of 
Lords’ veto power). 
 101 GRAEME BROADBENT, PUBLIC LAW DIRECTIONS 123 (2009) (noting the convention 
against Law Lords taking part in the creation of legislation). 
 102 See, e.g., 657 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (2004) 1217 (U.K.) (Lord Falconer citing an 
instance in which a Law Lord, who had commented on legislation, was then unable to sit on a 
judicial review). 
 103 DEP’T FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, supra note 81, at 11.  
 104 MASTERMAN, supra note 26, at 225. 
 105 DEP’T FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, supra note 81, at 20. 
 106 Id. at 11–12. 
 107 Id. at 10. 
 108 Aiden O’Neill, Judging Democracy: The Devolutionary Settlement and the Scottish 
Constitution, in BUILDING THE UK’S NEW SUPREME COURT, supra note 8, at 23, 45; King, 
supra note 73, at 247. 
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that different panels in two similar cases could produce the equivalent of a 
circuit split between them.109   
As with the HRA, however, the nationalist argument for reform was also 
present.  Being understood by Europe is quite different from capitulating to 
it.  Having a unified court system and being understood matters because of 
the expectation that UK judges can intercede in Europe on the country’s 
behalf; their rulings forestalling further review.  The argument for a supreme 
court relates directly to the dichotomy between “British judges” and foreign 
ones set up in the HRA debates.  The HRA thrusts the UK judge in between 
Parliament and Europe.  Subsequent reforms aimed to make that judge a 
more convincing representative. 
Adopting the HRA has not settled the matter of how, if at all, the United 
Kingdom should protect rights.110  Both the Brown and the Cameron 
Governments have again taken up the issue of whether there should instead 
be a British Bill of Rights.111  The possibility of “Brexit” from the European 
Union will be put to a vote in June.112  However, even today’s Conservatives 
are not prepared to leave the Council of Europe and the ECHR.  Instead they 
have now adopted Labour’s earlier strategy—defining rights domestically 
and increasing the power of judges in hopes that a British view of rights will 
                                                                                                                   
 109 Now, HRA violations pertaining to Scotland, like those involving England, may 
ultimately be judged by the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom.  See Anthony Bradley, 
The Sovereignty of Parliament—Form or Substance?, in THE CHANGING CONSTITUTION 25, 
35, 59 (Jeffrey Jowell & Dawn Oliver eds., 7th ed. 2011); Lester, supra note 96, at 265.  
Another potential source of a “circuit split” has not been removed, as the Supreme Court does 
not have jurisdiction over Scottish criminal cases.  O’Neill, supra note 108, at 43–44. 
 110 Even Labour Prime Minister Gordon Brown suggested creating a British “bill of rights 
and responsibilities.”  MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES: DEVELOPING OUR 
CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK, 2009, Cm. 7577, at 11–13 (U.K.).  The Conservative-Liberal 
Democrat Government that followed promptly took up the same issue.  COMMISSION ON A 
BILL OF RIGHTS, DO WE NEED A BILL OF RIGHTS? (2011), available at http://webarchive.natio 
nalarchives.gov.uk/20130128112038/http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/about/cbr/cbr-dis 
cussion-paper.pdf.  The issue is once again on Parliament’s agenda.  Human Rights and 
Prisoner Voting: Key Issues for the 2015 Parliament, http://www.parliament.uk/business/pub 
lications/research/key-issues-parliament-2015/justice/human-rights-and-prisoner-voting. 
 111 For instance, they characterize the ECHR as an “entirely sensible statement of the 
principles which should underpin any modern democratic nation.  Indeed the UK had a great 
influence on the drafting of the Convention, and was the first nation to ratify it.”  Protecting 
Human Rights in the UK: The Conservatives’ Proposals for Changing Britain’s Human 
Rights Law, CONSERVATIVE PARTY (GB), https://www.conservatives.com/~/media/files/down 
loadable%20Files/human_rights.pdf. 
 112 Economist Data Team, A Background Guide to “Brexit” from the European Union, 
ECONOMIST, Feb. 24, 2016, http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2016/02/graphics-
britain-s-referendum-eu-membership.. 
2015] NEW JUDICIAL REVIEW IN OLD EUROPE  21 
 
 
prevail.  The Conservative proposal for a British Bill of Rights explicitly 
states that it will transpose the ECHR into a bill of rights act, just as the HRA 
did.113  However, the Conservatives insist that their bill will be different 
because it does not instruct judges to follow ECtHR judgments as well as the 
ECHR.114  Given that British judges operate in a precedent-based legal 
system and that appeal to the ECtHR would remain open, these changes 
appear to be cosmetic.  
C.  Dirty French Laundry 
The Fifth Republic Constitution created France’s Constitutional Council 
in 1958 to help define the division of power in France’s semi-presidential 
system.115  The Council’s mandate soon expanded.  The 1958 Constitution 
included no discussion of rights in its operative clauses; these rights were 
read into the constitution through Council decisions interpreting the 
Preamble starting in 1971.116  At first, only a select group of political leaders, 
including the President, the Prime Minister, and the heads of both houses of 
Parliament could refer a law to the Council.117  In 1974, Parliament expanded 
access to the Council to allow sixty senators or deputies to send a new law to 
the Council for review; this soon became a common way to challenge 
legislation.118 The legislative majority, which is also typically the party that 
holds the presidency, controls the lawmaking process.119  Parliamentary 
minorities check the majority and contribute to law creation through their 
power to submit laws to the Council for abstract review and through the 
credible threat that they will use it.120  Until 2010, the Council engaged only 
in this abstract review. 
                                                                                                                   
 113 Id. at 2. 
 114 Id. at 5. 
 115 1958 CONST. arts. 56–63 (Fr.). 
 116 Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 71-44DC, July 18, 
1971, Rec. 29; Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 73-51DC, 
Dec. 27, 1973, Rec. 25 (first decision to make specific reference to the Declaration of the 
Rights of Man); Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 74-54DC, 
Jan. 16, 1975, Rec. 19 (referring to 1946 constitution when deciding challenge to abortion 
law); STONE, supra note 11, at 66–69. 
 117 WILLIAM G. ANDREWS, PRESIDENTUAL GOVERNMENT IN GAULLIST FRANCE: A STUDY OF 
EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE RELATIONS 1958–1974, at 116 (1982). 
 118 STONE, supra note 11, at 53–59. 
 119 Id. at 121. 
 120 Id. at 120–22. 
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As a result of French treaty obligations, Parliament and the President 
controlled constitutional, but not judicial, review.  French litigants could seek 
concrete review of legislation only under supra-national law because the 
French constitution directly incorporates treaty law into national law.121  The 
Constitutional Council declined to exercise review under the ECHR in 
1975.122  The other two supreme courts stepped in: the Court of Cassation 
took up ECHR review the same year;123 the Council of State waited until 
1989.124  In 1981, France acceded to the optional protocol allowing 
individuals to appeal their cases to the ECtHR.125  
President François Mitterrand first proposed the constitutional question 
procedure on July 14, 1989, presenting it as giving citizens a new right to 
constitutional protection.126  The Gaullists in the Senate blocked the 
proposal, but twenty years later, a Gaullist parliament passed a similar 
proposal.127  It resurfaced, and failed again, at the end of President 
Mitterrand’s term.128  Constitutional reform was again at issue in the 2007 
presidential election, and shortly after taking office, President Sarkozy 
                                                                                                                   
 121 1958 CONST. art. 55 (Fr.) (general provision incorporating international treaties).  See 
also 1958 CONST. art. 88 (concerning the transposition of EU law). 
 122 Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 74-54DC, Jan. 15, 
1975, Rec. 19, considérants 3–7 (Fr.). 
 123 This court breaks “ties” resulting from circuit splits among France’s general appellate 
courts. 
 124 SocCh. mixte, 24 mai 1975, aff. sté. Jacques Vabre, Bull. civ. C.M. n° 4 p. 6; D.1975.497 
concl. Touffait [hereinafter Jacques Vabre]; CE Sect., Oct. 20, 1989, Rec. Lebon 190, 
Frydman [hereinafter Nicolo]. 
 125 Elizabeth Lambert Abdelgawad & Ann Weber, The Reception Process in France and 
Germany, in A EUROPE OF RIGHTS, supra note 77, at 105, 109. 
 126 Projet de loi constitutionnelle n°1203 portant révision des articles 61, 62 et 63 de la 
Constitution et instituant un contrôle de constitutionnalité des lois par voie d’exception 
[Proposed Amendment revising articles 61, 62, and 63 of the constitution by Instituting 
Constitutional Review on an Exceptional Basis] Mar. 30, 1990 (Fr.). 
 127 Constance Grewe, L’élargissement de la saisine du Conseil constitutionnel, [Enlarging 
the Constituional Council’s Jurisdiction], in LA REVISION DE LA CONSTITUTION : JOURNEES 
D’ETUDES DES 20 MARS ET 16 DECEMBRE 1992 [Constituional Reform: Symposia of March 20 
and Dec. 16, 1992] 235, 240 (1993).  
 128 RAPPORT REMIS AU PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE LE 15 FEVRIER 1993 PAR LE COMITE 
CONSULTATIF POUR LA REVISION DE LA CONSTITUTION [Report to the President of the Republic 
on February 15, 1993 from the Consultative Committee on Constitutional Revision], JOURNAL 
OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [Official Gazette of France] [J.O.], Feb. 16, 1993, 
2537 [hereinafter 1993 Report],  available at http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/var/stor 
age/rapports-publics/0840 00091/0000.pdf. 
2015] NEW JUDICIAL REVIEW IN OLD EUROPE  23 
 
 
created a committee on institutional reform.129  In a few months’ time, the 
committee produced a report entitled “A More Democratic Fifth Republic,” 
which included the suggestions for concrete constitutional review that the 
Gaullists had once opposed.130  The final law allows litigants to raise a 
constitutional question related to individual rights at any stage in the 
proceedings.131  The claims are subject to review by the judge in front of 
whom the question is raised and are then sent to the Court of Cassation or 
Council of State, depending on whether the proceedings are “ordinary” or 
“administrative.”132  Those courts determine whether or not to send the 
question to the Constitutional Council, which will then decide the issue.133  A 
party seeking to raise a rights question must raise a constitutional question 
prior to asking for a decision under European or Community law.134  The 
resulting law aims to give the French constitution primacy, while 
consolidating review authority in the Constitutional Council. 
1.  Unfinished Integration 
Since President Mitterrand first introduced the priority question 
procedure, there has been a distinct paradox in the reforms’ presentation.  
Although reform was a matter of protecting France, it was also about keeping 
up with the neighbors by doing as they do.135  Even in 1990, such an 
institution could be presented as part of a model of constitutionalism shared 
                                                                                                                   
 129 Nicolas Sarkozy, President of Fr., Address at Épinal (July 12, 2007), http://discours.vie-
publique.fr/notices/077002273.html. 
 130 COMITE DE REFLEXION ET DE PROPOSITION SUR LA MODERNISATION ET LE REEQUILIBRAGE 
DES INSTITUTIONS DE LA VE REPUBLIQUE [Committee of Reflection and Proposition on the 
Modernization and Recalibration of the Institutions of the Fifth Republic], UNE VE 
REPUBLIQUE PLUS DEMOCRATIQUE [A More Democratic Fifth Republic] 68 (2008), available at 
http://www.comite-constitutionnel.fr/telechargements/Rapport_du_comite_une_Ve_Republiq 
ue_plus_democratique.pdf. 
 131 Loi 2009-1523 du 10 décembre 2009 relative à l’application de l’article 61-1 de la 
Constitution [Law 2009-1523 of December 10, 2009, Relative to the Application of Article 
61-1 of the Constitution] JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [Official 
Gazette of France], Dec. 11, 2009, 21379, ch. II § 1, art. 23-1. 
 132 Id. at ch. II § 1, art. 23-2. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Id. at ch. II § 1, art. 23-2(3). 
 135 Commentators such as Constance Grewe have presented the French reform as 
Europeanization, a step towards the creation of a German or Italian style constitutional court. 
Grewe, supra note 127, at 237–38. 
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by “all the great democracies” or, at least, many of the European ones.136  
Lacking such a system, France was an outlier.137  Such a status suggested 
that it ought to change to keep up with its counterparts. Justice Minister 
Pierre Arpaillange claimed that the reform would return France to the “rank 
that must be its own, that is to say the first, in the domain of protection of 
human rights.”138  Failing to protect rights in this way threatened the French 
government’s standing in Europe and in the eyes of its own people.  
In 1993, the Vedel Committee on constitution reform noted that the time 
was ripe for reform due to the “evolution of French democracy,” and pointed 
to France’s “unfinished” integration into the European order.139  The 
committee treated citizen initiative in the protection of constitutional rights 
through litigation as the normative model—a standard countries in the New 
Europe had to meet.140  The idea of reform as evolution was also present in 
legislative debate in which parliamentarians sought signs of convergence.141  
One deputy spoke approvingly of the “progressive harmonization” of 
European legal norms, calling it necessary as a uniform guarantee of the rule 
of law.142  
                                                                                                                   
 136 Assemblée Nationale, Seconde Session Ordinaire de 1989–1990, 2e séance du mardi le 
24 avril 1990, Débats Parlementaires, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] 
[OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Apr. 24, 1990, 604 (statement of Deputy Michel Sapin, 
Président du commission des lois [Chairman of the Law Committee]).  
 137 Id. at 594 (statement of Justice Minister Pierre Arpaillange).  Assemblée Nationale, 
Seconde Session Ordinaire de 1989–1990, 2e séance du mercredi le 25 avril 1990, Débats 
Parlementaires, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REEPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE 
OF FRANCE], Apr. 25, 1990, 667 (statement of Deputy Gérard Gouzes). 
 138 Parlimentary Debate, supra note 136, at 593 (statement of Justice Minister Pierre 
Arpaillange). 
 139 1993 Report, supra note 128, at 2547. 
 140 See id.  
 141 Sénat, Seconde Session Ordinaire de 1992–1993, séance du mardi le 26 mai 1993, 
Débats Parlementaires, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL 
GAZETTE OF FRANCE], May 26, 1993, 442 (statement of Sen. Michel Dreyfus-Schmidt); 
Assemblée Nationale, Seconde Session Ordinaire de 1992–1993, 3me séance du mardi le 22 
juin 1993, Débats Parlementaires, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] 
[OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], June 22, 1993, 2046, 2048, 2057, 2059 (statements of 
Deputies Jacques Floch, Jean-Jacques Hyest & Jean-Pierre Michel). 
 142 Assemblée Nationale, Seconde Session Ordinaire de 1992–1993, 3e séance du mardi le 
22 juin 1993, Débats Parlementaires, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] 
[OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], June 22, 1993, p. 2056 (statement of Deputy José Rossi). 
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2.  Rights at Home Rhetoric 
When President Mitterrand introduced his reform in 1989, supranational 
law was not as significant a factor as it is today.  But by April 1990, when 
Parliament was ready to discuss Constitutional Council reform, the situation 
had begun to change.  The Council of State had demonstrated its willingness 
to use treaty law to disapply domestic legislation in Nicolo.143  Shortly after 
debates over constitutional review began, the Strasbourg court handed 
France its first defeat in a case about government wire-tapping.144  The UN 
Human Rights Committee in Geneva had also recently censured France.145  
Those decisions provided a new rationale for reform, which the Prime 
Minister seized on in his opening remarks, explaining that he preferred 
sanction by French judges to “the humiliation of being sanctioned in Geneva, 
or, moreover, in a supranational court, at Strasbourg.”146 
Like the Prime Minister, some deputies treated constitutional review as if 
it would be a substitute for review under the ECHR, although nothing would 
have prevented both from operating simultaneously.147  Better “to wash your 
dirty laundry at home,” some Senators said.148  Others understood that 
European law would stay in the legal system, even with the creation of 
concrete constitutional review.149  They were concerned about the effects of 
                                                                                                                   
 143 Sénat, Seconde Session Ordinaire de 1989–1990, séances du mardi le 12 juin et mercredi 
le 13 juin 1990, Débats Parlementaires, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE 
[J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], June 12–13, 1990, 1513, 1551 (statements of Sens. 
Jacqueline Freysse-Cazalis & Paul Masson regarding Nicolo). 
 144 Id. at 1502 (statement of Justice Minister Pierre Arpaillange); Assemblée Nationale, 
Seconde Session Ordinaire de 1989–1990, séance du jeudi le 21 juin 1990, Débats 
Parlementaires, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE 
OF FRANCE], June 21, 1990, 2772 (statement of Deputy Pierre Mazeaud). 
 145 April 24, 1990 Parliamentary Debate, supra note 136, at 591 (statement of Prime 
Minister Michel Rocard) (referencing the cases).  This issue was later taken up by the Council 
of State.  MARCEAU LONG ET AL., LES GRANDS ARRETS DE LA JURISPRUDENCE ADMINISTRATIVE 
884–85 (15th ed. 2005).  
 146 April 24, 1990 Parliamentary Debate, supra note 136, at 591 (statement of Prime 
Minister Michel Rocard). 
 147 See, e.g., id. at 615 (statement of Deputy Francis Colcombat) (“France is constantly 
condemned by the Strasbourg court”). 
 148 June 12, 1990 Parliamentary Debate, supra note 143, at 1525 (statement of Sen. Michel 
Dreyfus-Schmidt); see also id. at 1526 (statement of Sen. Michel Dreyfus-Schmidt). 
 149 Assemblée Nationale, Seconde Session Ordinaire de 1989–1990, 2e séance du mercredi  
le 25 avril 1990, Débats Parlementaires, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE 
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the Constitutional Council’s 1975 decision to leave application of the ECHR 
to other courts.150  
Subsequent debates followed a similar path.  The 1993 debates repeated 
many of the themes from 1990, targeting European and EU (then, 
Community) law.151  Deputies complained that as lower courts made use of 
the ECHR, the hierarchy of norms, of which the constitution was supposed to 
be the apex, had fallen into disarray.152  To correct the problem, they insisted, 
one constitutional court should be given control over rights subject to diffuse 
review.153 
The theme of resistance to European law resurfaced in more recent 
debates.  The 2008 Senate Law Committee hearings soon focused on the 
hierarchy of norms.  Former Constitutional Councilor Jean-Claude Colliard 
critiqued the bill as allowing other courts to exercise constitutional review.154  
Former Justice Minister Badinter complained of the ECHR: “We could not 
live perennially with a system in which French courts can become censors of 
laws by invoking the European Convention on Human Rights . . . but could 
not censor laws based on the protection of fundamental rights inscribed in 
the Constitution.”155  Having reversed his previous position, President 
Sarkozy attended the fiftieth anniversary celebrations of the Constitutional 
Council and highlighted the reform, telling the assembled crowd, “I prefer 
                                                                                                                   
[J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], J.O., Apr. 25, 1990, 662 (statement of Deputy Jean-
Pierre Mazeaud). 
 150 Id. at 614 (statement of Deputy Jacques Barrot); April 24, 190 Parliamentary Debate, 
supra note 136, at 662, 666 (statements of Deputies Jean-Pierre Mazeaud and Gérard Gouzes).  
But see Assemblée Nationale, Seconde Session Ordinaire de 1989-1990, 1re séance du mardi 
le 24 avril 1990, Compte rendu intégral, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE 
[J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Apr. 24, 1990, p. 599 (statement by Deputy Michel 
Sapin) (arguing that allowing the Council to consider treaties such as the ECHR would lead to 
significant changes in French case law and should be avoided). 
 151 Assemblée Nationale, Seconde Session Ordinaire de 1992–1993, 3e séance du mardi le 
22 juin 1993, Débats Parlementaires, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] 
[OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], June 22, 1993, 2056–58 (statements of Deputies José Rossi 
and Jean-Pierre Michel).  Today, Article 88 gives special status to Community law, but at the 
time, both sources of supranational law had equal status.  Politicians regularly confuse the two 
in debate. 
 152 Id. at 2063 (statement of Deputy Arnaud Cazin d’Honincthun). 
 153 Id. 
 154 Hearing on Constitutional Reform Before the Commission des Lois, Sénat, 2008–2009 
Leg., 13th Sess. Ordinaire (2008), available at http://www.senat.fr/bulletin/20080526/lois.ht 
ml#toc2. 
 155 Sénat, Session Ordinaire de 2007-2008, séance du mardi le 24 juin 2008, Débats 
Parlementaires, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE 
OF FRANCE], June 24, 2008, p. 3356 (statement of Sen. Robert Badinter). 
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that our laws are censured based on our Constitution rather than based on 
international or European conventions.”156  
Discussions of the organic law that implements the judicial review 
amendment raised similar issues.  Law Committee hearings in the Senate and 
National Assembly asked how the procedures for constitutional adjudication 
would affect the use of the ECHR and EU law.157  Early drafts of the organic 
law did not specify how a judge had to respond to constitutional question 
motions compared to others based on European and Community law.  In the 
National Assembly hearings, experts and deputies attacked this provision as 
potentially allowing an escape hatch through which judges might avoid the 
constitutional question.158  The “hierarchy of norms” needed to be reflected 
in procedure.159  They had to end the “paradox”160 and “contradiction”161 in 
which citizens were used to invoking European rights rather than French 
ones.  Deputies remained concerned that the law would not assure priority 
for the French Constitution.162  The way to end that contradiction was to put 
the Constitutional Council at the top of a hierarchy of courts that paralleled 
the hierarchy of norms and to make it the first stop for litigants that invoked 
their rights.  The final design of the organic laws that give priority to 
                                                                                                                   
 156 Guy Canivet, Constitutional Councilor, La question prioritaire de constitutionnalité ou le 
“ravissement” du constitutionnaliste, Address at the University of Montpellier (Sept. 11, 
2009), ¶ 16. 
 157 Hearing on Constitutional Reform Before the Commission des Lois, Sénat, Session 
Ordinaire de 2008–2009 (Sept. 30, 2009), available at http://www.senat.fr/bulletin/20090921/ 
lois.html#toc3; Hearing on A.N. no. 1599 Before the Commission des Lois Constitutionnelles, 
de l’administration générale de la République (CR 58), Session Ordinaire de 2008–2009 (June 
23, 2009), available at http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/cr-cloi/08-09/c0809058.pdf; 
Hearing on A.N. no. 1599 Before the Commission des Lois Constitutionnelles, de 
l’administration générale de la République (CR 63), Session Ordinaire de 2008–2009 (June 
30, 2009), available at http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/cr-cloi/08-09/c0809063.pdf. 
 158 See Statement of Deputy Jean-Pierre Mazeaud, supra note 149. 
 159 Sénat, Session Ordinaire de 2009-2010, séance du mardi le 13 octobre, Débats 
Parlementaires, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE 
OF FRANCE], Oct. 13, 2009, 8559, 8565 (statements of Sens. Jean-Marie Bockel and François 
Zocchetto). 
 160 Id. at 8565 (statement of Sen. Zocchetto). 
 161 Id. at 8567 (statement of Sen. Robert Badinter). 
 162 Assemblée Nationale, Seconde Session Extraordinaire de 2008–2009, 1re séance du 
lundi le 14 septembre 2009, Débats Parlementaires, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE 
FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Sept. 14, 2009, 7042–43 (statements of 
Deputies Patrick Braouezec and Jean-Christophe Lagarde) (concern that litigants will not 
choose ECHR over constitutional review). 
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constitutional issues leaves little doubt that it meant to cause the litigant to 
favor internal norms.163   
Like the British, French conservatives did not subsequently reconcile 
themselves to ECtHR review.  Center-right deputies recently attempted to 
introduce a resolution instructing the government to renegotiate the terms of 
the ECtHR’s jurisdiction.164  However, the resolution quickly failed in the 
National Assembly where the left maintains a slim majority.165 
The UK and French reforms offer two particularly striking examples of 
countries with strong parliamentary traditions in which parliaments sought to 
empower national judges.  In both countries, reform was presented as 
simultaneous integration of national law into the European legal system and 
protection of the national law from Europe.  Parliament’s old allies against 
the local bureaucracy might be new allies against the transnational one, and 
in particular, against international courts with insufficient regard for local 
traditions.  Paradoxically, this position required adopting a European 
concept—judicial review, and in the case of the United Kingdom, “bringing 
home” European rights.  Although presented as a way of preventing outside 
meddling, this approach achieved one of the ECHR’s goals by providing 
more rights’ protection at the national level. 
IV.  THE BOUNDARIES OF DOMESTIC REFORM 
Several years have passed since the UK Supreme Court moved out of 
Westminster and down the street to Middlesex Guildhall and since the 
Constitutional Council issued its first decision in response to a priority 
constitutional question.  Have they promoted national values or European 
ones? The answer depends on how and whom one asks.  
                                                                                                                   
 163 Loi organique 2009-1523 du 10 décembre 2009 relative à l’application de l’article 61-1 de 
la constitution [Organic Law 2009-1523 of  December 10, 2009, Relative to the Application of 
Article 61-1 of the Constitution] JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] 
[OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Dec. 11, 2009, 21379, ch. II § 1, art. 23-2(3). 
 164 Proposition de résolution invitant le Gouvernement à renégocier les conditions de saisine 
et les compétences de la Cour européenne des droits de l’Homme (CEDH) sur les questions 
touchant notamment  à la sécurité nationale et à la lutte contre le terrorisme.  [Proposed 
Resolution inviting the Government to Renegotiate the Conditions for Referrals and 
Jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), Notably on Questions Related 
to National Security and the Fight against Terrorism], Assemblée Nationale, Feb. 18, 2015, 
available at http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/propositions/pion2601.asp. 
 165 ASSEMBLEE NATIONALE, SESSION ORDINAIRE DU 2014-2015, SEANCES DU JEUDI LE 2 AVRIL 
2015, Débats Parlementaires, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] 
[OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Apr. 2, 2015, 3457.  
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The reforms discussed above reflect the shared expectation that the 
ECtHR is actively seeking to expand its reach.  Parliament also assumed that 
national judges would seek to guard their terrain from interference by the 
ECtHR.  Within this assumption seems to be the idea that national courts will 
interpret rights in a manner that parliamentarians and the public find more 
congenial.  This view has merit.  Judges on the UK Supreme Court have 
openly criticized Strasbourg for overstepping its bounds, and substituting its 
judgment not only for the national legislature’s, but for their courts’ as 
well.166  Apex courts within a domestic political order remain tied and 
responsive to national politics through a variety of mechanisms.  In the very 
act of creating new review powers, parliaments have demonstrated their 
willingness and ability to alter those courts’ jurisdiction. Appointment 
processes also involve political choices. In the United Kingdom, review 
under the HRA gives Parliament an important role.167  In France, legislation 
or constitutional amendment are possible responses to a constitutional 
decision—something of which constitutional judges are well aware.168  
However, those ties do not guarantee that national judges will prefer 
national norms.  The ECHR gives national judges the ability to refuse to 
apply legislation that threatens human rights. Lacking other mechanisms, 
judges in systems of strong parliamentary sovereignty will find that power 
especially valuable.169  Litigants know that the ultimate destination of a claim 
may still be Strasbourg.  Additionally, CJEU and ECtHR case law prevents 
the UK Supreme Court and French Constitutional Council from blocking 
resort to these courts for rights review.  The Lisbon Treaty may restrict 
                                                                                                                   
 166 Lord Leonard Hoffmann, Judicial Studies Board Annual Lecture: The Universality of 
Human Rights, ¶¶ 15, 22–28, 39, 44 (Mar. 19, 2009), available at https://www.judiciary.gov. 
uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Hoffmann_2009_JSB_Annual_Lecture_Universality_of_Hu 
man_Rights.pdf; see also Stjin Smet, President of Belgian Constitutional Court Criticizes 
European Court of Human Rights, STRASBOURG OBSERVERS (May 17, 2010), http://strasbourg 
observers.com/2010/05/17/president-of-belgian-constitutional-court-criticizes-european-court-
of-human-rights/ (President Marc Bossuyt stating that he agrees with Lord Hoffman that 
Strasbourg fails to respect its “double subsidiary nature” to national legislatures and national 
courts).  
 167 See supra Part III.B. 
 168 See, e.g., Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2015-713 DC, 
23 July, 2014, Rec. 2751, paras. 2–3 (spelling out the responsibility of the legislature and 
President for safeguarding rights).  The Council repeated that Parliament enjoys wide 
discretion when legislating on rights.  The French Constitution has also been amended 
repeatedly throughout the life of the Fifth Republic. 
 169 King, supra note 73, at 249. 
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attempts by the UK Supreme Court or French Constitutional Council to 
block questions of EU law referred by lower courts.  Although France may 
give the constitutional question procedural priority, the ECtHR does not.  
The only way to alter this relationship would be through efforts at 
jurisdiction-stripping at the Council of Europe level.  The UK attempted to 
lead one such effort, but it was unsuccessful.  As a result, neither the UK 
Supreme Court nor the French Constitutional Council have the only, or the 
last, word on rights within their borders. 
 Instead, these jurisdictions are left with the continued ambiguity of what 
many have termed “judicial dialogue.”  At the transnational level, the 
dialogue is stilted because the ECtHR takes so long to respond.170  But 
lawyers and judges at the national level are constantly choosing the sources 
of law they refer to in petitioning for appeal and in adjudicating rights.  They 
control the dialogue by deciding whether they view national and 
international versions of rights as being in harmony or conflict.  Here, too, 
nationalists will be disappointed.  To the extent that their objections to 
European rights were not merely to form, but to substance, putting national 
courts in charge never could satisfy them.  Although national court 
judgments may convince Strasbourg that there exists a margin of 
appreciation, national rights adjudication takes place within European 
bounds.  The UK Supreme Court recognizes the ECHR’s influence directly 
and gives itself only a limited scope for resisting ECtHR interpretations.  The 
French Constitutional Council mostly has avoided explicitly referring to the 
ECHR in either its judgments or in the accompanying dossier, but its reading 
of the rights protected by the French Constitution corresponds with the 
ECHR.  
A.  The Failure of a Blocking Mechanism 
The European context in which they remain embedded limits the ability 
of national courts to block review in Strasbourg, even if they wanted to.  
Purely local reform simply cannot alter that.  UK Conservatives eventually 
realized as much, and proposed stripping jurisdiction from the ECtHR.  
However, they found that other member states had little appetite for strong 
measures and had to settle for merely reiterating the principle of subsidiarity.  
                                                                                                                   
 170 See ISUFI Int’l Assocs., Preparing a Case for the European Court of Human Rights, 
HG.ORG, http://www.hg.org/article.asp?id=4832 (noting the current backlog prevents the 
ECtHR from reviewing applications for about one year). 
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1.  Treaty Obligations Remain 
Prioritizing constitutional over transnational law may itself violate treaty 
obligations.  Judges in France scrutinized the constitutional question 
procedure as a possible violation because it would retard a litigant’s ability to 
vindicate his or her EU rights as had occurred in Belgium, which had 
adopted similar reforms.171  The CJEU ruled that interlocutory constitutional 
question procedure is invalid “so far as the priority nature of that procedure 
prevents . . . all the other national courts or tribunals [besides the 
constitutional court] from exercising their right or fulfilling their obligation 
to refer questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling.”172  
Because EU law includes the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which is very 
similar to the ECHR, and because the CJEU has incorporated the ECHR in 
its “general principles of EU law,” a preliminary rights ruling for a 
transnational court remains a possibility.  
At the same time that reforms are too strong for Luxembourg, they may 
be too weak for Strasbourg.  The UK Supreme Court cannot strike down an 
act of Parliament.  The ECtHR held in the 2002 case, Hobbs v. United 
Kingdom, that a declaration of incompatibility with the HRA did not offer a 
                                                                                                                   
 171 Called to provide an opinion on the constitutionality of the proposed law, the Belgian 
Council of State analyzed the proposed legislation in light of the CJEU’s Simmenthal 
decision, which discussed the relation of ordinary national law to community law and insisted 
on the primacy of the latter.  Avis du Conseil d’Etat [CE], 3 Mar. 2009, No. 45.905, ¶ 7 
(Belg.).  It mapped a way in which a national court might seek to circumvent the 
constitutional question by reviewing the law on constitutional question procedure for 
conventionality and sending a question to the CJEU.  Id. ¶¶ 5–8.  Soon after their respective 
constitutional questions were put in place, the Courts of Cassation in both Belgium and France 
raised the issue of whether the question violated EU treaties by giving priority to the 
constitutional court and limiting their ability to seize the CJEU.  Cases C-188/10 and 
C-189/10, Melki v. France, 2010 E.C.R. I-05667; Case C-457/05, Chartry v. Belgium, 2011 
E.C.R. I-00819; Guy Carcassonne & Nicolas Molfessis, La Cour de cassation à l'assaut de la 
question prioritaire de constitutionnalité, LE MONDE (PARIS), Apr. 23, 2010.  The CJEU heard 
both cases and decided the French case first, holding that the constitutional question could 
avoid violating EU law only if all French courts remained free to refer cases to the CJEU, to 
provide provisional protection for EU rights, including fundamental rights under the Charter 
(identical to the ECHR), and to refuse to apply law contrary to EU law.  Melki, 2010 E.C.R. I-
05667, ¶ 76. 
 172 Melki, 2010 E.C.R. I-05667, ¶ 57. 
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sufficient domestic remedy because it is not binding on the parties and 
because it does not require Parliament to amend its legislation.173 
Meanwhile, France has adopted a model that gives several judges 
discretion as to whether a petition reaches the constitutional court.  This type 
of discretionary petition does not necessarily meet the ECHR’s standard for 
domestic remedy.  In Horvat v. Croatia, the ECtHR held that a petition to 
that country’s constitutional court was not a domestic remedy to be 
exhausted because the court had discretion over whether to the hear the case 
and because a successful petition had to meet several other criteria, such as 
the requirement that the petitioner’s rights were “grossly violated.”174  This 
formulation did not create a sufficiently certain domestic remedy that 
petitioners could be required to exhaust before going to the ECtHR.175  
France introduced multiple levels of discretionary, rather than mandatory, 
review because it is up to the judge and then, to the Court of Cassation and 
Council of State to decide whether to submit a constitutional question up the 
chain to the Constitutional Council.176  Manifest violation or non-violation 
may prove no less ambiguous than “gross violation” in the ECtHR’s eyes.  
However, the ECtHR used the same case to announce that it considered the 
practical, as well as de jure, availability of the remedy or hearing.177  These 
jurisdictions may fare better on that scale. 
EU and European doctrines combine to undermine any blocking potential 
the reforms may have.  They underscore how little the solution of judicial 
review accords with the rhetoric that accompanied its adoption.  Introducing 
more rights review at the national level does not preclude ECtHR review.178  
Nor does it allow national courts to take and maintain an attitude toward 
rights fundamentally different from Strasbourg’s without censure.  Domestic, 
supreme or constitutional courts have greater capacity that can be used to 
                                                                                                                   
 173 Hobbs v. United Kingdom, App. No. 63684/00, 44 Eur. H.R. Rep. 54 (2002).  However, 
if a court has the option of reading down legislation to make it compliant with the HRA, the 
ECtHR considers this reading a remedy that must be exhausted before it will hear the case.  
Upton v. United Kingdom, App. No. 29800/04, 47 Eur. H.R. Rep. 24 (2006). 
 174 Horvat v. Croatia, App. No. 51585/99, 6, ¶¶ 41–42 (2001). 
 175 Id. at 6–7, ¶ 43. 
 176 The Council’s Secretary General pointed this out early on.  Marc Guillaume, Question 
Prioritaire de Constitutionnalité et Convention Européenne des Droits de L’Homme, 32 LES 
NOUVEAUX CAHIERS DU CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL 67, 91–92 (2011). 
 177 Horvat, App. No. 51585/99, at 7. 
 178 On this issue in France, see Constance Grewe, Contrôle de constitutionnalité et contrôle 
de conventionalité: à la recherche d'une frontière introuvable, 100 REVUE FRANÇAIS DE DROIT 
CONSTITUTIONNEL 961, 962 (2014). 
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resolve rights disputes, but that does not necessarily mean they will reduce 
the burden on the ECtHR.179  
2.  Seeking a Wider Margin 
From a nationalist perspective, the constitutional changes I described 
would be more successful if they matched a renewed commitment to the 
principle of subsidiarity and a wide margin of appreciation.  Adopted 
unanimously in April 2012, the Council of Europe’s Brighton Declaration 
changes the preamble to the ECHR to enshrine the principle of 
subsidiarity.180  It also includes detailed instructions describing how member 
states would like the ECtHR to enact this principle.  As long as they do not 
appear in the form of an additional protocol, the court is free to ignore these 
instructions, and Sir Nicholas Bratza, the UK judge and then President of the 
ECtHR, announced his intention to do as much.181  However, the declaration 
shows one direction the push for national judicial review could take and 
exemplifies an effort to broaden the trend. 
The Brighton Declaration was primarily the work of the UK Government, 
which sought to strip ECtHR jurisdiction.182  In February 2012, newspapers 
                                                                                                                   
 179 The UK Supreme Court began sitting in October 2009.  Thus far, it has received a total of 
612 applications, most of which were refused.  It has issued 183 judgments, including 
judgments on issues unrelated to the HRA.  THE SUPREME COURT ANNUAL REPORT AND 
ACCOUNTS 2011–2012, at 22–23; THE SUPREME COURT ANNUAL REPORT AND ACCOUNTS 
2010–2011, at 22; THE SUPREME COURT ANNUAL REPORT AND ACCOUNTS 2009–2010 HC 64, 
at 23, available at http://www.supremecourt.gov.uk/news/annual-report.html.  The French 
Constitutional Council has issued 435 decisions on constitutional questions.  CONSEIL 
CONSTITUTIONNEL, QUESTION PRIORITAIRE DU CONSTITUTIONNALITE, http://www.conseil-consti 
tutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/francais/les-decisions/acces-par-type/les-decisions-qpc.48 
300.html.  
 180 Brighton Declaration, Eur. Ct. H.R. art. 12(b), 3 (2012). 
 181 Owen Bowcott, European Court of Human Rights President Criticizes UK Reforms, THE 
GUARDIAN (Manchester), Apr. 19, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2012/apr/19/europea 
n-court-human-rights-uk-reforms?newsfeed=true. 
 182 Vaughne Miller & Alexander Horne, The UK and Reform of the European Court of Human 
Rights, HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY, Mar. 29, 2012, available at http://www.parliament.uk/bri 
efing-papers/SN06277; David Cameron, Speech on the European Court of Human Rights (Jan. 
25, 2012), in THE GUARDIAN (Manchester), Jan. 2012, http://www.theguardian.co.uk/law/2012/ 
jan/25/cameron-speech-european-court-human-rights-full?intcmp=239.  It has the support of at 
least some HRA advocates.  Anthony Lester, The European Court of Human Rights Needs These 
British Reforms, THE GUARDIAN (Manchester), Mar. 13, 2012, http://www.theguardian.co.uk/co 
mmentisfree/2012/mar/13/court-human-rights-needs-british-reforms. 
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in the United Kingdom and France obtained a leaked document outlining the 
Cameron Government’s strategy for reforming the ECtHR.  The 
memorandum outlines a number of reforms aimed at nationalizing rights and 
judicial review, presented as a way to reduce the ECtHR’s caseload.183  It 
would have limited ECtHR involvement to cases in which the national court 
made a manifest error or in which the ECHR question was of grave 
importance.184  The final declaration does not include this provision, 
replacing it with threatening language, but no jurisdiction stripping. 
The Brighton Declaration raises two factors contributing to the ECtHR’s 
untenable workload: weak national institutions and an interventionist 
court.185  This characterization encompasses the human rights demands of the 
East and the democratic angst of the West.186  The declaration’s insistence on 
sovereignty and the plethora of articles specifically mentioning national 
institutions make clear that national governments, and not the ECtHR, should 
play the leading role in rights protection.  National governments should also 
typically be the exclusive source of such protections.  The declaration calls 
on member states who lack an “independent National Human Rights 
Institution” to create one.187  The parties were careful not to specify that the 
institution be a court, but this expectation is implicit in calls for “new 
domestic legal remedies, whether of a specific or general nature.”188  
                                                                                                                   
 183 See James Landale, UK Presses for European Human Rights Convention Changes, BBC 
NEWS, Feb. 29, 2012, available at http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-17201024 (discussing 
the leaked position paper known as the Brighton Draft). 
 184 Id.  
 185 See Brighton Declaration, supra note 180, arts. 6–7. 
 186 As Article 3 makes evident, the Declaration aims both to empower and to constrain 
national actors: 
The States Parties and the Court share responsibility for realizing the 
effective implementation of the Convention, underpinned by the fundamental 
principle of subsidiarity.  The Convention was concluded on the basis, inter 
alia, of the sovereign equality of States.  States Parties must respect the rights 
and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention, and must effectively resolve 
violations at the national level.  The Court acts as a safeguard for violations 
that have not been remedied at the national level.  Where the Court finds a 
violation, States Parties must abide by the final judgment of the Court. 
Id. art. 3.  The last two sentences temper the aggressive language of the first three, as does 
Article 7, which calls for national courts to take the convention into account. Id. arts. 3, 7, 
9(a)–(c), 10, 11, 12(a)–(c). 
 187 Id. art. 9(c)(i). 
 188 Id. art. 9(c)(iii). 
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Increased national attention to the Convention’s values is to be coupled with 
decreased attention from Strasbourg.189  
A watered-down Brighton Declaration has been incorporated into 
Protocol 15, amending the ECHR’s preamble to state that “the High 
Contracting Parties, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, have the 
primary responsibility to secure the rights and freedoms defined in this 
Convention and the Protocols thereto, and that in doing so they enjoy a 
margin of appreciation.”190  It accomplishes only the mildest jurisdiction 
stripping—reducing by two months the time that parties have to file.191  It 
sits somewhat uneasily next to Protocol 16, which allows national judges to 
refer questions to Strasbourg for advisory opinions.192  Such a provision 
might encourage national courts to avoiding taking responsibility for hard 
cases through a well-timed reference.  Lower courts using this protocol 
might also bypass the national apex courts, frustrating legislative attempts to 
restore a hierarchy of norms. 
B.  Dialogues and Monologues 
The expectation that national courts can substitute for international ones 
actually involves a set of assumptions favorable to European norms.  For 
review under the national constitution to replace review under the ECHR, 
whether by local judges or at Strasbourg, the rights protection offered under 
constitutional law must be at least as robust as that under the ECHR.  And it 
must be done in a manner similar enough to the ECtHR’s approach to rights 
protection that even foreign judges sitting in Strasbourg can agree that it is as 
protective of the same fundamental rights.  Only then can the new 
constitutional review take the place of convention review.  Viewed in this 
light, the claims made by UK and French reformers are not contradictory—
                                                                                                                   
 189 See id. art. 11. 
 190 Protocol No. 15 Amending the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature June 24, 2013, C.ET.S. No. 213, available at 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Protocol_15_ENG.pdf; see also Comm. of Ministers, 
Protocol No. 15 Amending the Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms-Explanatory Report, 123d Sess., para. 7, Doc. No. CM(2012)166–add (2012). 
 191 Id. art. 35. 
 192 Protocol No. 16 Amending the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature Oct. 2, 2013, C.E.T.S. No. 2014, available at 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Protocol_16_ENG.pdf. 
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internalization of European rights really will stop “embarrassment” at 
Strasbourg. 
The strong version of the nationalist argument thus assumes that domestic 
rights law provides an adequate substitute for the ECHR.  This ends up 
resembling the more pro-European story—that Convention rights should be 
fully incorporated into national law.  First, for domestic review to replace 
international review, the national constitution or statute must be at least as 
protective of fundamental rights as the ECHR.193  Moreover, the constitution 
must not offer an approach to rights that differs significantly from the 
approach that an ECtHR judge would take.  Unless this assumption holds, 
constitutional law does not provide a shield from the ECtHR; the losing party 
will simply “appeal” to Strasbourg.  Appeal will be unavailing only if values 
and approaches already have to be internalized, or conversely, the nation’s 
values and approaches must have heavily influenced European ones.194  
Members of the UK Parliament were endorsing this view when emphasizing 
the Britishness of the ECHR.195  The French Justice Minister also invoked 
his country’s historical leadership in the development of human rights.196  
The ECtHR explicitly allows states to differ in how they implement the 
Convention under the margin of appreciation.  Almost any case the court 
hears for argument will tend to turn on whether the national government has 
engaged in a rights violation by going below this floor, or whether it has 
applied the rules within its margin of appreciation.  In judging whether a 
state has stepped outside the margin, the concept of European consensus 
looms large.  A challenge to practice that is within this consensus will likely 
result in a case being rejected as manifestly ill-founded.197  The cases that get 
argued are cases in which there is no consensus, or a state seeks to deviate 
from the consensus.  Staying within this consensus is likely to be the only 
                                                                                                                   
 193 UK judges are legally bound to interpret the HRA in a manner “no less” expansive than 
the ECtHR’s ECHR interpretation.  Stephen Gardbaum, Reassessing the New Commonwealth 
Model of Constitutionalism, 8 INT’L J. CONST. L. 167, 191 (2010). 
 194 See Helen Keller & Alec Stone Sweet, Assessing the Impact of the ECHR on National 
Legal Systems, in A EUROPE OF RIGHTS, supra note 77, at 677, 710. 
 195 See 582 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (1997) 1227f, reprinted in BLACKBURN, supra note 
72, at 377. 
 196 Assemblée Nationale, Seconde Session Ordinaire de 1989–1990, 2me séance de mardi le 
24 avril 1990, Débats Parlementaires, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] 
[Official Gazette of France], Apr. 24, 1990, 593 (statement of Justice Minister Pierre 
Arpaillange). 
 197 Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou & Pavel Repyeuski, European Consensus and EU Accession to 
the ECHR, in THE EU ACCESSION TO THE ECHR 309, 312 (Vasiliki Kosta, Nikos Skoutaris & 
Vassilis Tzevelekos eds., 2014). 
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way to protect a state from Strasbourg review.  Moreover, national courts are 
not well placed to determine the scope of the margin of appreciation.  So, a 
case that turns on the margin of appreciation will typically mean a 
Strasbourg appeal.  That does not mean that the state may not ultimately win 
its appeal.  But if the aim is to avoid ECtHR oversight entirely, relying on the 
margin of appreciation is risky.  
The ECtHR frequently cited the House of Lords and now cites the UK 
Supreme Court in order to understand UK law.  It did so prior to the HRA.198  
UK courts generally accept ECtHR jurisprudence and apply it in domestic 
law.199  However, in select cases, the courts have refused to accept the 
ECtHR’s interpretation at face value and have either issued a controversial 
re-interpretation on the issue or, rarely, confronted Strasbourg.200  European 
judges take seriously calls by the House of Lords and Supreme Court to 
reconsider their judgments.  For instance, judicial dialogue led Strasbourg to 
alter its view of hearsay evidence, although the result was only a partial 
victory for the UK Government.201  Cases remain in which the UK Supreme 
Court and the ECtHR are at odds, such as with prisoner voting. The ECtHR 
has now ruled several times that a blanket ban on prisoners’ voting is 
unacceptable under Article 3 of Protocol 1 of the Convention, but the UK 
courts have refused to find incompatibility with the HRA.202  Although 
Westminster might prefer that Strasbourg actually listen, its own courts’ 
refusal to apply Strasbourg’s rule immediately is a signal that courts will, at 
least in some instances, defend a British interpretation of Convention rights. 
Although a parliamentary committee found inadequate implementation of 
the ECHR and a “flood” of applications to Strasbourg,203 the number of cases 
in which Strasbourg censured the United Kingdom went down in 2009 and 
                                                                                                                   
 198 MASTERMAN, supra note 26, at 28. 
 199 Merris Amos, The Dialogue Between the United Kingdom Courts and the European 
Court of Human Rights, 61 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 557, 564 (2012). 
 200 Id. at 565–68, 582; see also Victor Nealon v. Sec’y of State for Justice, [2015] EWHC 
1565, [46] (admin) (finding the Strasbourg court’s decision regarding the applicability of 
Article 6(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights to section 133 of the Criminal 
Justice Act of 1988 unpersuasive and erroneous). 
 201 Delaney, supra note 90, at 586–89. 
 202 Amos, supra note 199, at 578–79. 
 203 LORDS & COMMONS JOINT COMM. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ENHANCING PARLIAMENT’S ROLE 
IN RELATION TO HUMAN RIGHT’S JUDGMENTS, 2010–15, H.C. 455, at 5, available at http:// 
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200910/jtselect/jtrights/85/85.pdf. 
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2010, when the Supreme Court was established.204  This observation suggests 
that the UK Supreme Court may be helping to bring UK case law in line with 
European norms, and the UK Supreme Court’s explanations of the UK 
approach may have encouraged Strasbourg judges to find that it fits within 
the margin of appreciation.  In many cases, the former approach seems to 
have taken hold, with the UK courts implementing ECtHR case law to 
expand the HRA.  For instance, in Ullah, the UK Supreme Court was willing 
to recognize much more extensive defenses to deportation on the basis of 
ECtHR judgments.205  The UK Supreme Court also overturned the House of 
Lords’ earlier ruling in Marper that retaining fingerprints and DNA profiles 
was not a violation of Article 8 after the ECHR’s judgment finding a 
violation in Marper.206  The Supreme Court ruled that the statute authorizing 
police collection of data was unlawful.  Instead of ordering destruction of all 
of the collected data because the statute was unlawful, the Court allowed 
Parliament a reasonable time to cure the deficiencies in the statute.207 
On balance, the ECtHR appears to have devoted less attention to the 
French Constitutional Council.208  That body’s syllogistic reasoning style 
provides less material to respond to than do the UK Supreme Court’s 
seriatim opinions, but Strasbourg judges reference the other French supreme 
courts, the Court of Cassation and Council of State, much more often.209  
Dialogue with the Council may be only a matter of time; French cases 
decided in the past year show greater engagement with the Constitutional 
Council’s reasoning.210  However, the Council’s own approach to European 
law has barely changed. 
                                                                                                                   
 204 Amos, supra note 199, at 581.  The Supreme Court, COURTS AND TRIBUNAL JUDICIARY 
(2015), https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/about-the-judiciary/the-justice-system/the-supreme-court/. 
 205 Id. at 580. 
 206 R (GC) v. Comm’r of the Police, [2011] UKSC 21, [15] (citing S. and Marper v. United 
Kingdom, App. Nos. 30562/04, 48 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1169 (2008)). 
 207 Id. at 45–49. 
 208 The ECtHR did not review any cases from the French Constitutional Council in 2014.  
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, ANNUAL REPORT 2014, at 64 (2015), available at http:// 
www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Annual_report_2014_ENG.pdf. 
 209 In 2014, the ECtHR reviewed only two cases from France, one from the Council of State 
and one from Court of Cassation. 
 210 See, e.g., Agnelet v. France, App. No. 61148/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 33 (2013), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?/=001-115980 (reference to Constitutional Council’s decision on 
a priority question); Segame SA v. France, App. No. 4837/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 38 (2012), 
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre?i=002-3881 (discussing the Constitutional Council’s 
ruling on a priority question); Depalle v. France, App. No. 34044/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 35-37 
(2010) (reference to Constitutional Council in pre-2009 case). 
2015] NEW JUDICIAL REVIEW IN OLD EUROPE  39 
 
 
The French Constitutional Council’s approach to European case law is 
markedly different from the UK Supreme Court’s.  This difference arises not 
only because of its very different style of giving judgments, but because the 
Council has maintained since 1975 that it is a judge of the constitution, not of 
treaties.211  This attitude did not change after the creation of the priority 
constitutional question procedure.  The Council’s priority question decisions 
appear in a traditional format, and they are often spare, even in important 
cases, with a singular focus on the law (in this case the constitution).212  This 
format meshes with the understanding that law is legitimate if it is clear on 
the face, which encourages a syllogistic style because it presents the 
Council’s interpretation as flowing deductively from the law as written.  
The Council draws from an eclectic mix of sources for rights law.  The 
operative clauses of the 1958 Constitution contain no rights, so the Council 
instead references the 1798 Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen 
and the Preamble to the 1946 Constitution, both of which are cited in the 
1958 Constitution’s preamble.  The Council also has recourse to “general 
principles” of the French Constitution.  In response to constitutional 
questions, it will typically cite to the above documents and principles directly 
as well as to its own prior case law or, more rarely, the Court of Cassation or 
Council of State.  Unlike the ECHR, which has no direct constitutional 
standing, Article 88 of the French Constitution gives EU law a distinct place 
in the constitutional order, and the Council has been called on to judge issues 
such as the constitutionality of the Lisbon Treaty.213  In contrast, I have not 
found an instance in which the Council cited either the ECHR, an ECtHR 
judgment, or a French court’s judgment about an ECHR article.  
Sources beyond the text of opinions suggest that the ECHR and ECtHR 
jurisprudence both have influence.  The Council is quite aware that its 
syllogisms sometimes require further explanation, and publishes a “dossier” 
of documents related to the case.  In important cases, its Secretary General 
will often publish an academic commentary.  ECHR references are not 
prominent in the dossiers.  In one case, its decision stating that Parliament 
                                                                                                                   
 211 Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 74-54DC, Jan. 15, 
1975, Rec. 19 (Fr.). 
 212 Grewe, supra note 178, at 965. 
 213 Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2007-560DC, Dec. 20, 
2007, Rec. 459 (Fr.) (Lisbon Treaty accession).  The Council even referred a question to the 
CJEU.  See Christine Maugue, La QPC: 5 Ans Déjà et Toujours Aucun Prescription en Vue, 
79 LES NOUVEAUX CAHIERS DU CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL 9, 15 (2015). 
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could prohibit same-sex marriage, the Council cited to two ECtHR decisions 
noting that states have a margin of appreciation in this area in the 
accompanying dossier.214   A decision upholding a new law allowing same-
sex marriage included one ECtHR decision.215  It has also cited ECtHR 
decisions in its review of security legislation in the wake of recent terror 
attacks.216 
However, even when the Council does not mention it, the ECHR seems to 
have had an effect.217  Among the general principles of constitutional law are 
several rights, such as a right to privacy in personal data and the right to 
family life, which directly track ECHR rights not recognized elsewhere in 
the constitutional corpus.  For instance, the Council’s decision on the 
retention of DNA information of all convicted offenders never mentioned the 
ECtHR’s Marper judgment, but the Council’s holding that blanket retention 
was unconstitutional was certainly in keeping with Strasbourg’s.218  At the 
outset, professional commentary surrounding the Council embraced the idea 
of convergence between the Council’s decisions and the ECtHR’s.219  
                                                                                                                   
 214 Conseil constitutionnel [CC] decision No. 2010-92QPC, Dossier documentaire, http:// 
www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/root/bank/download/201092QPCdoc. 
pdf (same-sex marriage prohibition). 
 215 Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2013-669DC, Dossier 
documentaire, http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/root/bank/down 
load/2013669DCdoc.pdf (law allowing same-sex marriage). 
 216 Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2015-719DC, Dossier 
documentaire, http://www.conseil-consitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/root/bank/downlo 
ad/2015713DC2015713dc_doc.pdf (domestic intelligence gathering); 2015-527QPC, Dossier 
documentaire, http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/cons eil-constitutionnel/root/bank/down 
load/2015527QPC2015527qpc_doc.pdf (temporary house arrest permitted by emergency 
legislation). 
 217 Constitutional scholar Denys de Bechillon noted this phenomenon.  See Denys de 
Béchillon, Cinq Cours Suprêmes: Apologie (Mesurée) Du Désordre, 137 POUVOIRS 33, 36 
(2011). 
 218 Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2010-25QPC, Sept. 16, 
2010, Rec. 220 (retention of genetic data). 
 219 Most significantly the Council’s Secretary General, who directs legal staff that aid in 
research for its decisions, embraced this view in a commentary in its official journal.  
Guillaume, supra note 176, at 91.  He cited the work of Olivier Dutheillet de Lamothe, an 
influential member of the Council of State and proponent of the convergence thesis.  Id. at 68, 
78 (citing Dutheillet de Lamothe, supra note 8).  Guillaume was at particular pains to describe 
how the Council’s procedure would meet due process standards under Article 6 of the ECHR.  
Id. at 70–83.  The Council would thus apply the ECHR through its practice though it might 
not refer to it in its legal interpretations, which were to remain limited to the constitution.  Id. 
at 67.  See also Helène Surrel, Conseil constitutionnel et jurisprudence de la CEDH, 47 LES 
NOUVEAUX CAHIERS DU CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL 311 (2013) (discussing convergence 
between French and ECHR rules related to the independence of tribunals). 
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Moreover, the structure of the constitutional question means that 
constitutional judging is not confined to the Constitutional Council.  The 
lower courts, the Council’s co-apex courts, and the Council of State and 
Court of Cassation have substantial familiarity with the ECHR as well as 
responsibility for framing and filtering constitutional questions.  This 
mandate makes convergence in legal orders likely to occur.220 
In both France and the United Kingdom, reforms have mainly led to 
courts seeking compatibility with the ECHR and the ECtHR’s interpretations 
of it.  These decisions forestall more censure on the international level, 
preventing international “embarrassment” by weaving the ECHR and 
Strasbourg’s approaches to it more tightly into domestic law.  Importantly, 
they require that lower courts now have to attend to domestic high courts and 
domestic sources of law when judging rights.221 
British conservatives, never entirely mollified by Labour’s promises of 
avoiding Strasbourg, are not pleased and continue to contest the HRA’s 
existence as well as the United Kingdom’s ties to the EU and Council of 
Europe.  The UK Supreme Court faces the same criticism as the ECtHR.  In 
France, however, the continued appeal of anti-Europe rhetoric, readily 
apparent with the National Front party’s rise, is not mixed with anti-Council 
rhetoric.  The Council has taken a cautious approach, emphasizing the 
Constitution to the exclusion of other sources of law.  It has also repeatedly 
emphasized Parliamentary power to set policy in controversial cases in 
which there is a clear margin of appreciation.  An example of such cases are 
same-sex marriage and abortion in which the Council has refused to engage 
arguments about equality and dignity.222  A priori review powers give it 
continued importance to all parties in Parliament.  Along with these 
structural factors, the Council’s rights review powers may have simply not 
been around long enough.  In another decade, it may have its first major 
confrontation with Parliament over rights or answer a constitutional question 
in a way that places it firmly outside the margin of appreciation, both of 
which might require more direct use of the ECHR.  
                                                                                                                   
 220 Grewe, supra note 178, at 966. 
 221 See Maugue, supra note 213, at 15–16. 
 222 See, e.g., Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2013-669DC, 
May 17, 2013, Rec. 721 (Fr.) (Parliament may decide whether to allow or prohibit same-sex 
marriage); 2010-9 QPC, supra note 214; Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] 
decision No. 2014-700 DC, July 31, 2014 (Fr.) (Parliament has authority to remove 
restrictions on abortion). 
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The approach to rights jurisprudence created by the states parties is 
pluralistic but favors the continued primacy of the ECHR.223  The CJEU and 
ECtHR are unwilling to wait categorically, for the domestic courts.  British 
attempts at actual jurisdiction-stripping fizzled in Brighton, and member-
states were left instead with a new preliminary reference protocol that, once 
enacted, could take more issues out of the apex courts and give them to the 
ECtHR.  The UK Supreme Court and the French Constitutional Council 
have, for the most part, brought national law in line with Europe.  The 
difference in the Supreme Court’s open dialogue with the ECtHR and the 
Council’s decision to cite only the constitution reflect differences in 
prevailing norms for their own legal systems.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
Individual petition under the ECHR brought the end of strong 
parliamentary sovereignty across Europe.  Under pressure from the ECtHR, 
old democracies have chosen to adopt more robust forms of judicial review.  
The political rhetoric supporting their adoption included some references to 
embracing modern, human-rights oriented Europe, but also included a large 
dose of legal protectionism.  In the United Kingdom and France, parliaments 
sometimes treated national judicial review as an alternative to international 
review.  This it may be, but only if subsidiarity works as it is supposed to and 
national rights law largely matches the international court’s rules—a result 
pro-Europeans would be at pains to disagree with.  The system outlined here 
resembles the pattern of overlapping jurisdictions and ultimate consensus one 
might see in a federal court system.224  If constitutional meaning changes as 
                                                                                                                   
 223 Nico Krisch, The Open Architecture of European Human Rights Law, 71 MOD. L. REV. 
183, 184 (2008). 
 224 See Rudolf Smend, Constitution and Constitutional Law, in WEIMAR: A JURISPRUDENCE 
OF CRISIS 240, 248 (Arthur J. Jacobson & Bernhard Schlink eds., Belinda Cooper trans., 2000) 
(“[C]onstitutional law is expected to ensure fulfillment of an ever-changing challenge that 
must constantly be met in an optimal fashion.  The factors in meeting this challenge shift as 
time goes by and situations change.”); see also Akhil Reed Amar, Five Views of Federalism: 
“Converse-1983” in Context, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1229, 1245–47 (1994).  But the American 
system’s preemption and abstention doctrines work very differently.  Federal law is not 
subsidiary to state law, but rather preempts it—and state supreme courts, final interpreters of 
their state constitutions, receive no margin if interpreting the national constitution instead.  
Although he mistakenly thinks that a federal system would create a stable one, de Béchillon 
has argued that French scholars should throw out the idea of a hierarchy of norms and 
embrace the tension between treaty and constitution because it better reflects actual practice.  
See de Béchillon, supra note 217, at 36–37. 
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the demands that people place on it change, the balance that federal 
constitutions create between local and national readings may also change.225  
It is out of the blurring of boundaries and of the origin of legal values that a 
shared normative universe can emerge.  
Meanwhile, the national courts’ place in the European legal order is likely 
to change again.  The EU’s Charter of Rights covers much the same content, 
and the CJEU has held that EU law incorporates ECHR rights as general 
principles.  If accession to the ECHR cannot occur, and the CJEU’s 
interpretations fail to track the ECHR either de jure or de facto, national 
courts may end up moderating between them.  The real challenge for the old 
democracies may lie in the development of domestic jurisprudence that goes 
beyond the European minimum, so that the ECHR, which has emboldened so 
many courts in emerging democracies, does not become an excuse for 
complacency in established ones. 
  
                                                                                                                   
 225  Id.  Commenters have often made this point regarding American federalism.  See, e.g., 
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